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THE QUESTIONING OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT NOMINEES
DURING THE SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
William G. Ross*
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Senate's growing recognition of the political significance of lower
federal judges is reflected in its increasing scrutiny of nominations to the U.S.
district courts and courts of appeals.' In addition to studying information about the
nominee provided by the White House, the FBI, the ABA, and various other
sources, the Senate Judiciary Committee directly interacts with each nominee
through oral and written questions. This questioning process is an increasingly
prominent part of the confirmation process.'
Each nominee testifies before the Committee to answer questions. Although
some hearings are largely ceremonial,3 other hearings probe various subjects that
may concern senators, including a nominee's political predilections, temperament,
and character. The Committee also requires all nominees to complete a
* Visiting Professor, Notre Dame Law School; Professor of Law, Cumberland School
of Law of Samford University. A.B., 1976, Stanford; J.D., 1979, Harvard. The author wishes
to thank Brannon P. Denning and Brent W. Herrin for their thoughtful comments concerning
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' As one commentary has explained, "[l]ower federal court judges are increasingly
viewed as having an important policy-making function, and more recent presidents have
acted to shape the bench in their policy image." Roger E. Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes,
IncreasingSenate scrutiny oflowerfederal court nominees, 80 JUDICATURE 274,274 (1997).
2 The questioning of nominees has been particularly significant since 1995. Scrutiny of
nominees is especially careful during times of divided government when the committee is
controlled by a party that is adverse to the president. Senators whose party does not control
the White House normally have more incentive to ask questions than does the governing
party insofar as the latter generally can assume the president has nominated persons whose
views are consistent with their own. During the Clinton Administration, the large majority
of questions at confirmation hearings were asked by Republican senators, and most of these
questions sought assurances that the nominees were not "activists." Democratic senators
generally directed most of their questions to the more controversial nominees in an apparent
attempt to elicit comments which would quell the concerns of the Republican senators. Some
commentators contend that the Senate was too intrusive in its review of Clinton's nominees.
See Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World ofJudicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch
and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REv. 247 (1999). Other commentators contend that it was not tough
enough. See Thomas L. Jipping, From Least Dangerous Branch to Most Profound Legacy:
The High Stakes in Judicial Selection, 4 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 365 (2000).
' See e.g., Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., July 25, 2000.
At this hearing, Senator Kyl explained that "[t]he reason why this hearing is not the highly
charged, well attended, difficult grilling'of candidates that you've perhaps seen on some
occasions, is because these four candidates are of such high quality, they have been vetted
with my colleagues, with staff, with outside groups, and there's nothing wrong with them."
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questionnaire that becomes part of the public record as well as another
questionnaire that remains confidential. The public questionnaire is detailed and
wide-ranging, containing more than two dozen questions, many with subparts. In
addition to asking standard biographical questions about education, employment
history, health, and publications, the questionnaire makes detailed queries about the
nominee's lawyering experience, finances, and process of selection." The
confidential questionnaire inquires about discharges from employment, tax
delinquency, investigations for possible violations of any criminal statute or
administrative regulation, bankruptcy, and ethical breaches.'
" As revised most recently during the autumn of 2001, the questionnaire calls for the
following biographical information: 1) full name; 2) position for which nomination was
made; 3) current office address and phone number; 4) date and place of birth; 5) marital
status, including spouse's occupation, employer's name, and business address; 6) names of
each college and law school attended, and titles and dates of degrees; 7) employment record
since college; 8) military service, including dates and branch of service, rank and serial
number, and type of discharge; 9) honors and awards; 10) bar association memberships; 11)
bar and court admissions; 12) memberships in other professional, business, fraternal,
scholarly, civic, charitable, or other organizations since graduation from college and whether
any such organization formerly discriminated or presently discriminates on the basis of race,
sex, or religion; 13) published writings, and copies of speeches in written or videotaped form
given during the past ten years; 14) congressional testimony; 15) present state of health and
date of last physical examination; 16) (for judges) (a) summary and citations of the judge's
ten most significant opinions, (b) summary and citations of all appellate opinions in which
the judge's opinion was reversed or affirmed with criticism, and (c) citations for significant
opinions on state or federal constitutional issues; 17) federal, state, and local public offices
held, memberships and offices held, and unsuccessful candidacies for elected or appointed
public offices; and positions held or roles played in political campaigns, including the
candidate, dates of campaign, title and responsibilities; 18) professional legal experience,
including (a) clerkships, solo practice, law finn affiliations, (b) description of general
character of law practice and if and when its character has changed and description of typical
former clients and areas of specialization; (c) frequency of court appearances, percentage of
court appearances in federal courts, state courts of record, and other courts, number of cases
tried to verdict or judgement rather than settled, and percentage of trials that were decided
by ajury; 19) description of the ten most significant litigated matters personally handled; 20)
criminal conviction record within ten years of nominationi, other than "minor" traffic
violation; 21) description of all civil or administrative proceedings in which nominee has
been a party within ten years; 22) potential conflicts of interest, and proposed manner for
their resolution; 23) plans, commitments, or arrangements to pursue outside employment,
with or without compensation during service on court; 24) sources of income; 25) statement
of net worth; 26) process leading to nomination, including whether selection commission
recommended nomination and whether anyone involved in the selection process has
discussed cases or legal issues in a manner that might create the appearance of prejudice if
the nominee were confirmed. Questionnaire For Nominees Before the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate (on file with author) [hereinafter Questionnaire].
' Questionnaire for Nominees Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate: Confidential (on file with author) [hereinafter Confidential Questionnaire]. The
Confidential Questionnaire also asks the nominee to "advise the committee of any
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With transfer of the Committee's organization to the Democrats during 2001,
the Committee revised the questionnaire for the first time since control of the
Committee shifted from the Democrats to the Republicans in 1995. Although the
revised questionnaire has retained virtually all of the questions that the old
questionnaire asked, it added a query about criminal convictions during the past ten
years, other than for traffic violations.
Responses to these questionnaires typically fill dozens of pages. Nominees
recognize the need to respond carefully and seriously to the Committee's inquiries.
Margaret M. Morrow, for example, sifted through ninety boxes of her old files in
preparing for her written and oral testimony.6
Despite its importance, the Judiciary Committee's questioning of lower federal
court nominees has received scant attention, even though the appointment of lower
federal judges has received increasing scholarly attention7 and the questioning of
Supreme Court nominees has received substantial scrutiny.' This article will
discuss the ways in which oral and written questions have helped, and can continue
to help, the Senate decide whether to confirm lower court nominees. This article
will argue that the Senate should inquire more aggressively into the backgrounds
and opinions of nominees. Although the nominees are properly reluctant to make
comments that might indicate how they would rule in particular cases, nominees
often. could provide more expansive explanations of their views on various legal
issues about which they are questioned. Senators, however, have rarely prodded
nominees to provide more than perfunctory answers to the wide range of issues that
arise at confirmation hearings. Particularly in a time of divided government, the
Senate cannot adequately discharge its "advice and consent" function unless it
demands to know more about the nominees.
unfavorable information that may affect your nomination." Id.
6 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1997 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 105th Cong. 41 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 Hearings Part 1].
' For a study of the history of appointments of lower federal judges, see SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997). For a general study of the federal appointments process, see
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000).
' See Michael Comiskey, The Real and Imagined Consequences of Senatorial Consent
to Silent Supreme Court Nominees, 11 J.L. & POL. 41 (1995); Stephen J. Wermiel,
Confirming the Constitution: The Role of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 121; Albert P. Melone, Judicial Discretion and the
Senate's Role in Judicial Selection: Questioning Supreme Court Nominees, 16 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 557 (1992); William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate
Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of the Senate and
Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, TUL. L. REv. 109 (1987); Grover Rees, III,
Questions For Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the
Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913 (1983).
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I. SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY
A. General Considerations
In assessing the qualifications of nominees, the Senate must determine what
criteria to use in determining whether a nominee deserves confirmation. Although
the Senate Judiciary Committee's written questionnaires provide a useful list of
factors that the Senate obviously regards as important, the lack of formal criteria
makes the evaluation of lower federal nominees as amorphous as the Senate's
assessment of Supreme Court nominees. As one scholar has pointed out, no power
of the Senate "seems more discretionary than the decision whether to confirm a
judicial nominee."9  Another commentator has ruefully remarked that "[t]he
Senate's standards are basically parochial - based on each senator's personal
views and partisanship."'" Although some commentators have proposed that the
Senate adopt specific criteria for Supreme Court nominees," the framing of precise
guidelines for any federal judicial nominees would be impracticable. There is no
way to bind senators to any guidelines, so consideration of nominees would remain
idiosyncratic even if specific criteria were announced. 2 Moreover, any formal
criteria theoretically would interfere with the independence of individual senators,
whose decisions on nominees are ultimately based upon complex and intangible
considerations that range from political calculation to personal conscience. 3
' Christopher H. Schroeder, Congress Stories, 65 SO. CALL. REV. 1531, 1558 (1992).
As Professor Schroeder has observed:
Historically, it has been impossible to define a set of decision criteria for the
Senate's decisions on judges and justices, other than to say that each Senator is
sensitive to the entire political context of his or her vote - roughly what one would
have to say about many other decisions, perhaps all other significant decisions, a
Senator makes.
Id.
10 DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE 76 (1988).
" See William G. Myers, III, Advice and Consent on Trial: The Case ofRobert H. Bork,
66 DENy. U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988); Marilyn J. Ireland, The Best Person for the Job:
Tomorrow's Standard for Selecting Supreme Court Justices, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 127, 133-37 (1991).
2 As one commentator has pointed out, "the actual criteria used in evaluating a Supreme
Court nominee typically have been a personal, very individual matter for each Senator.
Hence, it might be impracticable for the Senate to attempt to establish any criteria designed
to be binding upon all its Members." DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, THE SUPREME COURT
PROCESS: SHOULD IT BE REFORMED? 81 (1993). There is no reason to suppose that
consideration of lower federal nominees is any less individual.
'3 As Senator Edward Brooke explained in 1970 during the debate over the nomination
of G. Harrold Carswell to the U.S. Supreme Court:
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Despite the absence of formal factors, there is a broad consensus that
professional competence, sound health, energy, personal integrity, and judicial
temperament are paramount considerations. 4 There is also general agreement that
the nominee must demonstrate a commitment to fundamental constitutional values,
particularly protection of minority rights. Although the degree to which the Senate
may consider a nominee's political and ideological predilections is more
controversial, there is no doubt that such considerations are important factors in the
confirmation process. These criteria are essentially the same as those used by the
Senate in evaluating Supreme Courtjustices. As one task force onjudicial selection
explained, "[c]ertain qualities, such as demonstrated disinterestedness and
knowledge of the law, are essential for all federal judges."' 5 As the task force
pointed out, however, "because different skills are required at different levels of the
judiciary, different considerations ought to come into play in the selection and
confirmation of federal judges at each level."' 6
In particular, the Senate regards trial experience as an important qualification
for district court judges. Indeed, Senator Sessions believes that "some experience
We are not supposed to make a decision based upon whether one is liberal or a
moderate or a conservative, a Republican or a Democrat, but based upon our own
individual responsibility as U.S. Senators. Each of us, in his own mind and
conscience and heart, must ask [: is] this a man to sit on the Supreme Court? There
is nothing else.
116 CONG. REc. 10160 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1970).
" The District of Columbia Federal Judicial Nominating Commission has listed the
following criteria for selection of district court judges:
a. Integrity - intellectual honesty, moral vigor and professional uprightness.
b. Professional skills and experience - broad knowledge of the law and substantive
legal and legally relevant experience.
c. Impartiality - the ability to treat cases objectively regardless of the identity of
the parties or subject matter in controversy.
d. Industry - a diligent and energetic worker.
e. Good health.
f. High respect in the legal and local community.
g. Respect for the Bill of Rights and for the rights of all litigants, entities and parties
before the court.
b. Judicial temperament - dignity, sensitivity and understanding.
i. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing.
j. Demonstrated commitment to equal justice.
k. Decisiveness - the ability to make difficult decisions quickly and with firmness.
By-Laws and Procedures for the District of Columbia Federal Judicial Nominating
Commission, reprinted in Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Circuit, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 159, 188 (1993).
" O'BRIEN, supra note 10, at 5.
16 Id.
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as a trial lawyer is almost required" for a district judgeship.'7 In addition to the
obvious technical advantages that such experience affords, trial experience can help
make a judge more empathetic with the problems faced by attorneys in trying
cases.' 8 The importance of trial experience is reflected in the written questionnaire,
which requires the nominee to "describe the ten most significant litigated matters
which you personally handled" and to list what percentage of his or her appearances
in court have been in federal and state court respectively at different periods of the
nominee's career, and what percentage were tried by a jury. 9
B. Professional Competence
Although professional competence may be the cornerstone of the Senate's
consideration ofjudicial nominees, competence is rarely an important issue because
presidents seldom nominate anyone who has not achieved a relatively high degree
of professional eminence. The Senate nevertheless needs to make an independent
evaluation of each nominee's professional competence. This is probably the subject
on which face-to-face contacts between the nominee and the Committee are least
important. The nominee's resume provides the Senate with basic knowledge of the
nominee's credentials, and the ABA, leading attorneys, and other third parties
regularly provide assessments of the nominees' professional abilities. The
Committee also is able to elicit much useful information directly from the nominee
through its questionnaire, which seeks particularly detailed information about the
nominee's trial experience, a credential which many senators rightly regard as
particularly important in evaluating district court nominees. In various instances,
the questionnaire has helped persuade senators that the nominee has the requisite
trial experience.2"
The Senate naturally regards state judicial experience as an excellent
qualification for the federal judiciary, although the Senate recognizes that
differences between state and federal systems may require some adjustment. The
hearings can help assess the degree to which a nominee appreciates the differences
between state and federal courts. When asked about the difference between the
federal district court to which he had been nominated and the Virginia state court
1" 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 521 (remarks of Sen. Sessions). Senator
Sessions stated that "it is good to know that [the] judge has been down there, been in the pits,
knows what it is like, the difficulties that a lawyer faces in just doing his job every day." Id.
at 520.
I Id.
'9 See Questionnaire, supra note 4.
20 Senator Feinstein, for example, thought it was significant that Audrey B. Collins had
tried more than 200 cases to a verdict during her years as assistant district attorney in Los
Angeles, for "[t]his type of experience is invaluable as a judge carefully weighs the facts."
Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1994 Hearings before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, Part 3, 103rd Cong. 3 (1996) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings Part 3].
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on which he served, for example, Judge Norman K. Moon explained that the major
difference was that federal courts are much more liberal in their use of summary
judgment.2
If a nominee lacks judicial experience or extensive trial experience, the hearings
provide the nominee with an opportunity to persuade the Committee that other
experience is relevant. For example, William Fletcher, who had spent most of his
career as an academic, acknowledged that his scholarship on such topics as
nineteenth century marine insurance would be of little use to him as a judge, but he
contended that his authorship of a treatise about civil procedure should be helpful.22
Judge Ann L. Aiken, an Oregon state judge, testified during the hearings on her
nomination to the U.S. District Court that "[f]ederal courts have different issues,
more complex issues, resources available to it to decide cases early, to make a
difference with alternative dispute resolution and Judge Jerome B. Friedman, a
Florida state judge, observed that federal judicial decisions affect a broader range
of persons."23
Since many nominees have deep but relatively narrow experience as attorneys,
the Senate also seeks assurances from nominees that they will attempt to familiarize
themselves with areas of the law that are unknown to them. For example, Audrey
B. Collins, a longtime criminal prosecutor, told the Committee that she had begun
to study civil law and planned to attend a training session at the Federal Judicial
Center.2 4 Similarly, Florence Marie Cooper promised that she would attend an in-
house training program forjudges, attend orientation programs for newjudges, and
would study materials prepared by the Center.25 Vanessa D. Gilmore explained that
she had sought the assistance of the Center and sitting judges.26 Various nominees
have also indicated that they would participate in a mentoring program.2
In the rare instances in which a nominee's qualifications are an issue, testimony
provides the nominee with a useful opportunity to directly address concerns of
Committee members. After a majority of the ABA's Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary opined that Alexander Williams, Jr. was "not qualified" for a
district court judgeship, Williams defended his qualifications in detail before the
2 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1997 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 2, 105th Cong. 686 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 Hearings Part
2].
2] Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1998 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 3, 105th Cong. 1033 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 Hearings Part
3] (testimony of William A. Fletcher).
23 Id. at 687-88, 90.
24 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 5-6.
25 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1999 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 106thCong. 127-28 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 Hearings Part
1].
26 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 679.
27 Id.; see also id. at 682 (testimony of Terry C. Kern).
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Committee.28 Williams responded to the ABA's report by discussing his experience
as a litigator and law professor, as well as his publications. Williams' testimony
may have helped overcome reservations about his ability for he was confirmed.29
Testimony by nominees has sometimes raised or exacerbated doubts about their
familiarity with the law. In 1996, senators expressed disappointment in the
testimony of a Court of Appeals nominee who seemed unfamiliar with the Supreme
Court's landmark decision on affirmative action in Adarand v. Pena3°, was unable
to cite any Fourth Amendment decision concerning search and seizure, and seemed
to know little about the constitutional law of capital punishment." This testimony
may have reinforced the allegations of critics that the nomination was a political
reward for the nominee's success in raising seven million dollars for the 1992
Clinton campaign and $3.4 million for the Democratic National Committee.32 After
his testimony, the nominee withdrew his name from consideration.3The Committee also may obtain insights into qualifications by inquiring into
why the nominee wishes to become a federal judge, a question that senators have
asked various nominees. 4 Another useful question concerns the difficulties they
expect to encounter in their transition from private practice to a career on the
federal bench."
In considering qualifications, it also may be useful for the Committee to assess
the extent to which political connections, rather than merit, influenced the
28 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1994 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 4, 103rd Cong. 299-305 (1996) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings
Part 4].
29 See, e.g., Nelson Schwartz, Prince George's Prosecutor Wins Seat on Federal Bench,
BALT. SUN, Aug. 18, 1994, at 12A.
30 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
31 142 CONG. REc. S3766 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Dole). The
nominee later told a reporter that he was familiar with the Adarand decision but that he did
not recognize its name and that Senator Kyl moved on to another topic before he was able
to discuss it. Neil A. Lewis, Judge Nominee Draws Fire From GOP, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Apr. 14, 1996, at A8.
32 See 142 CONG. REc. S3766 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Dole); The
Wrong One to Judge, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at 1OA, 1996 WL 7112786.
"' Joan Biskupic, Appeals Court Nominee Says No Thanks, WASH. POST, May 10, 1996,
at AI7.
14 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 244 (response of Margaret M. Morrow to
question from Sen. Thurmond); id. at 471 (response to questions for Arthur Joseph Gajarsa
from Sen. Thurmond). Ms. Morrow explained that she would like to devote herself "full-
time to the judicial process and the administration of justice." Mr. Gajarsa stated that
"becoming a judge is a means of becoming a public servant and paying back my community.
As a judge, I would be able to fulfill the highest calling of all - that is to be a public
servant, to decide cases and to further the administration of justice."
" Id. at 239 (response of Donald M. Middlebrooks to question from Sen. Thurmond).
Mr. Middlebrooks explained that he recognized that he would need to relinquish some of the
freedom and privacy that he had enjoyed as a private citizen. Id.
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nomination. Accordingly, it was encouraging that the Committee's new Democratic
leadership tried to sharpen the questionnaire's inquiry into the political activities
of nominees. In contrast to the old questionnaire, which merely asked whether the
nominee had "ever held a position or played a role in a political campaign" and
requested nominees to provide "particulars," the September 2001 revision called for
an itemized list of political contributions to political campaigns and political parties
during the past ten years.36 This question would have provided important insights
into the political background and predilections of nominees. The omission of this
question under pressure from Republican Senators37 is unfortunate because the
public has a right to know the extent that judicial appointments may be rewards for
political favors, even if the nominee is otherwise fully qualified.
C. Personal Integrity
Because the backgrounds of potential nominees are carefully studied by the
executive branch with the assistance of the FBI, the nomination process normally
will eliminate candidates whose records are clouded by issues of personal character.
Even this screening process, however, might neglect to uncover significant
information. Because the personal integrity of judges is critical to the integrity of
the courts, the Senate still needs to conduct its own independent investigation of
character issues. Direct communication between senators and nominees can help
to facilitate such investigations.
The revised questionnaires promulgated in September 2001 by the Democratic
leadership should facilitate such exchanges. In contrast to the old questionnaire,
which asked no questions about a nominee's prior arrests or convictions, the new
public part of the questionnaire asks the nominee to:
State whether you have ever been convicted of a crime, within ten years of
36 As Senator Leahy explained,
This more specific question is similar to information requested and made public by
other Senate Committees (See, e.g., Committees on Governmental Affairs; Foreign
Relations; Armed Services; Banking Health Education Labor and Pensions; and
Veteran's Affairs). Indeed, in a post-Watergate reform, the Congress required that
such information be provided by nominees and made public in the Congressional
Record for certain nominees. (See Department of State Appropriations
Authorization Act of 1973, § 6, P.L. 93-126; Id., P.L. 93-475; Foreign Service Act
of 1980, § 304, P.L. 96-465; 22 U.S.C. § 3944)."
Letter from Sen. Leahy to Sen. Sessions (Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
17 See Confidential Questionnaire, supra note 5; see also, Michael Chidester, Democrats
Try to Bend the U.S. Judiciary Branch, U-WIRE, Oct. 30, 2001, 2001 WL 29604828;
Editorial, Leahy's War Cover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A26.
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your nomination, other than a minor traffic violation, that is reflected in a
record available to the public, and if so, provide the relevant dates of arrest,
charge and disposition and' describe the particulars of the offense.38
While the Senate ordinarily will already have information about a nominee's
criminal record (in the rare instances where such a record exists), the revised form
provided the nominee with an opportunity to provide the Senate with his own
explanation of what happened.
The confidential questionnaire continues to ask other important questions
concerning a nominee's personal integrity. The form asks: whether the nominee
has ever been discharged from employment or resigned in order to avoid discharge;
whether the nominee has filed and paid all taxes; whether any tax lien ever has been
filed against the nominee; whether the nominee ever has "been the subject of any
audit, investigation, or inquiry for federal, state, or local taxes;" whether the
nominee or his or her spouse ever has declared bankruptcy; whether the nominee
has ever been under federal, state, or local investigation for a possible violation of
any civil or criminal statute or administrative agency regulation or whether any
organization of which the nominee is an officer, director, or active participant has
been the subject of such investigation; whether the nominee has "been the subject
of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, bar association, disciplinary
committee, or other professional group for breach of ethics, unprofessional conduct
or a violation of any rule of practice;" and "any unfavorable information that may
38 The question originally called for information about arrests and convictions within a
twenty-year period. As Senator Leahy has explained in introducing the new question:
Thus, criminal history records that are under seal or that have been expunged would
not be required to be disclosed by this request. While I appreciate that some
Members may want information on all arrests and convictions (other than minor
traffic violations), as other Committees demand of nominees, I am satisfied that
limiting this criminal history information to records already available to the public,
and reflecting criminal conduct within 20 years of the nomination, will adequately
serve the purposes of this Committee.
Letter from Leahy to Sessions, supra note 36.
Under pressure from Republicans, the committee later amended the question to
delete references to arrests, and to shorten the time period to ten years. Questionnaire
for Nominees Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Confidential
Questionnaire, supra note 5. See also, Audrey Hudson, Bush Nominees Balk at Arrest
Query, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, 2001 WL 4166619. The reduction of the time
period from twenty years to ten years is ill-advised because the Senate should certainly
want to learn all that it can about the criminal record of anyone who has been nominated
to the federal bench. Ideally, the Senate should not place any time limitations on this
question.
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affect your nomination."39
Although the FBI reports presumably would provide information about tax
problems, criminal investigations, and bankruptcy, the form provides the nominee
with an opportunity to explain these situations in his or her own words. Moreover,
the FBI reports are made available only to members of the Judiciary Committee, in
contrast to the confidential questionnaire, which will be available to all senators.
As originally drafted in September 2001, the confidential questionnaire also
included a question about prior use, possession, purchase or distribution of any
illegal substance.40 This question was deleted at the behest of Senate Republicans
who argued that such information would appear in FBI reports and that inclusion
of such information even in a confidential form could facilitate leaks that could
embarrass a nominee.4
Contrary to the contention of Republicans, the now deleted question about
illegal substances was so broad that it was likely to uncover information that would
be unavailable even to the FBI. As Senator Leahy explained, "the old questionnaire
asked no specific question about a nominee's prior use, possession, purchase or
distribution of illegal substances, despite the fact that nominees.., are intended to
... serve as federal judges who preside over federal criminal proceedings. ' 42 If
nominees could have been trusted to answer this question truthfully, it would have
enabled senators to adequately assess the fitness of nominees to the bench. The
deletion of this question is, therefore, unfortunate. Although critics of the question
contended that leakage of the information to the public was likely,43 the importance
of the information in evaluating the fitness of judges who will preside over drug
trials surely outweighs any danger and embarrassment to nominees.
D. Temperament
The oral testimony of nominees is particularly useful in helping the Senate to
assess the nominee's judicial temperament. Senator Biden observed during a recent
hearing that temperament is the most important consideration in judicial
confirmations for members of the Judiciary Committee. 4 "We worry ... most
about temperament," Biden explained, "because almost everybody follows
precedent. '45 As Senator Biden pointed out, the unique security of a lifetime
" Confidential Questionnaire, supra note 5.
40 id.
41 See Hudson, supra note 38; Leahy's War Cover, supra note 37.
42 Letter from Leahy to Sessions, supra note 36. Leahy explained that the old
questionnaire contained in its "confidential portion a 'catch all' request for 'any unfavorable
information' and [left] to the discretion of the nominee whether to respond with any
information about illegal drug use." Id.
43 Leahy's War Cover, supra note 37.
4 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 667 (remarks of Sen. Biden).
4' Id. (remarks of Sen. Biden).
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appointment has caused a few judges to regard their confirmation "as a
beautification, as ascension into heaven, a notion that somehow, when they are no
longer answerable, they are no longer required to treat people with courtesy."46
Accordingly, senators often ask nominees written and oral questions about their
views onjudicial temperament.4 Senator DeConcini succinctly asked one nominee,
"How do you keep a level head?"'48 In addition to providing answers to specific
questions about temperament, the manner in which the nominee answers questions
on other subjects and the nominee's very bearing before the Committee may help
the Committee to form opinions about the nominee's judicial temperament.
In evaluating temperament, the Senate also may take into account the extent to
which nominees are in touch with the needs of "ordinary" persons who appear as
litigants. Some nominees, for example, have explained that their experiences in
raising children have helped make them empathetic toward the problems that
countless Americans encounter in everyday life.49 Nominees sometimes have
offered thoughtful responses to queries about temperament that have transcended
perfunctory professions of humility. Ricardo M. Urbina, for example, explained to
the committee that he had tried during his thirteen years as a state trial judge to
assure parties and their attorneys that he was listening to them. 0 Senators also may
assess temperament by inquiring about a nominee's aspirations. For example,
Senator Feinstein asked one nominee how she would like to be regarded as a judge
after ten or fifteen years."
Since the concept of judicial temperament is capable of so many definitions,
senators have shrewdly perceived that the manner in which nominees themselves
definejudicial temperament may be more revealing of their temperament than stock
answers to boilerplate questions about temperament. At one hearing, for example,
Senator DeWine asked a group of nominees to define temperament, which various
46 Id. (remarks of Sen. Biden). Biden observed that judicial demeanor rather thanjudicial
decisions are what most often makes senators regret the confirmation ofjudges. Id.
4' Id. at 237 (response of Jeffrey T. Miller to written question from Sen. Thurmond).
48 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 946.
41 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1033 (testimony of William A. Fletcher); id.
at 1041 (testimony of Chester J. Straub).
o 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 946. Urbina recalled:
[T]hat as a lawyer, at times, one of the most frustrating parts of being an attorney
was having a judge who I was not convinced had listened to me. Winning or not
prevailing, I think, is a much more tolerable experience if you can be assured that
you have a judge who has listened to you.
Id.
5' 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 387 (testimony of Virginia A. Phillips). The
nominee explained that she would want to be seen as hard-working, prepared, willing to
listen to both sides, well versed in the law, and respectful of the dignity of all persons with
whom she worked. Id.
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nominees described as commitment to being the best judge possible; 2 dedication
to resolving cases and controversies;" humility; 4 fairness;" courtesy to litigants; 6
thoughtfulness in deliberations;" patience;58 preparation; 9 ability to render timely
and well-explained decisions;" a sense of humor;6' and an open mind.62
Senators obviously have more of a basis for evaluating a nominee's judicial
temperament when the nominee already has served as ajudge. Although most such
judges receive high accolades for their temperament, the interviews provide an
opportunity for senators to assess the personalities of those few nominees for whom
temperament is an issue. For example, the hearings allowed senators to probe
doubts about the district court nomination of a Pennsylvania state trial judge who
told an attorney at a sidebar conference a dozen years earlier to "shut your f-----.g"
mouth and had said "I don't give a f--k" another time in open court.6" The judge
explained to the Judiciary Committee that she "apologized profusely" to the
attorney in the sidebar incident and had subsequently worked amicably with him.'
Not all senators were entirely satisfied with this explanation, however, and they
took the "extraordinary step of holding a second hearing to give [the nominee] the
opportunity to answer the [C]ommittee's questions and respond to the criticisms
made of her."65 Senatorial concern about these incidents, together with allegations
that the nominee identified undercover agents in open court, contributed to
opposition to the nomination that culminated in its withdrawal.66
Another nominee may have ruined his chances for confirmation when his
testimony reinforced widespread suspicions that he was insensitive to racial and
ethnic minorities. 7 The Atlanta Constitution observed that:
32 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 367 (testimony of Charles J. Siragusa).
3 Id. (testimony of Siragusa).
'4 Id. (testimony of Siragusa); id. at 368 (testimony of Algenon L. Marbley).
" Id. at 368 (testimony of Algenon L. Marbley); id. (testimony of Dale A. Kimball).
56 Id. (testimony of Marbley).
17 Id. (testimony of Marbley).
58 Id. (testimony of Kimball).
I9 d. (testimony of Kimball).
I /d. (testimony of Kimball).
61 Id. at 369 (testimony of Richard Conway Casey).
62 Id. (testimony of James S. Gwin).
63 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 28, at 1040, 1045 (statements of Judge Frederica
Massiah-Jackson).
64 Id. at 1020.
65 Nomination of Frederica A. Massiah-Jackson, of Pennsylvania, to be US. District
Court Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 105th Cong. 1-2 (1998) (opening
statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
Id. at 6, 8-12, 15-16; Ed R. Haden, Judicial Selection: A Pragmatic Approach, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 531, 500 (2001).
67 The nomination of U.S. District Court Judge Kenneth E. Ryskamp to a Court of
Appeals judgeship had been opposed by a broad spectrum of civil liberties organizations in
part because of allegedly insensitive remarks that the nominee had made. David G. Savage
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rather than substantially moderating his past cloddishness or putting any
uneasy minds to rest, he jumped to his own defense in terms that reasserted
the same creepy attitudes that were being questioned. Really, what
assurance of understanding could Hispanics expect from a jurist who
complains there are too many Spanish foods in grocery stores these days?68
Even Senator Specter, who voted for the nominee, conceded that the nominee
"stated his own case very inadequately, very, very poorly."69 The nomination died
after the Committee voted eight to six against sending the nomination to the full
Senate.7"
Since racial and gender sensitivity is part of the Committee's evaluation of
temperament, the hearings have afforded some nominees an opportunity to explain
membership in racially restrictive clubs, which could cast doubts on their ability to
administer the laws impartially." Numerous nominees have indicated that they
have attempted to eliminate racial restrictions on club membership and to increase
the racial diversity of clubs that already admit racial minorities. When questioned
about his membership in an Oklahoma country club that had no African-American
members, one nominee explained that he had attempted to recruit black members
and that he was responsible for persuading the club to remove racial restrictions
during the 1970s."
& Ronald J. Ostrow, Penchant for Ill-Advised Comments May Scuttle Jurist's Confirmation,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1991, 1991 WL 2300349. Similarly, Senator Robert Graham of
Ryskamp's home state ofFlorida was reported to be particularly concerned about Ryskamp's
sensitivity toward racial minorities. Sharon LaFraniere, Graham Joins Opponents of
Ryskamp, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1991, at A19. The nominee's remarks on racial issues also
inspired a flurry of editorials opposing the nomination. See Sharon LaFraniere, The Case
Against Ryskamp, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, 1991 WL 2305422; Other Voices, ATLANTA
CONST., Mar. 27, 1991, 1991 WL 7780653; Packing the Circuit Courts, BALT. SUN, Mar.
1, 1991, 1991 WL 5858374.
68 Judiciary Committee Drew the Right Line, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 14, 1991, at
H4.
69 Judicial Nominee is Rejected, S.F. EXAM'R, Apr. 14, 1991, at A12.
70 Sheldon Goldman, Bush's JudicialLegacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE, Apr.-
May 1993, at 290.
71 In 1990, the Judiciary Committee adopted a resolution stating that persons who belong
to discriminatory clubs where business is conducted should not be nominated to the federal
bench unless they have actively engaged in efforts to eliminate discriminatory practices. See
Diane Worth & Nancy M. Landis, Does Membership have its Privileges? The Limits on
Permissible Discrimination in Private Clubs, 60 J. KANSAS CITY BAR Assoc. 27, 36 n.4
(1991).
712 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 682-83.
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E. Consideration of Political Philosophies
1. The Legitimacy of Consideration of Political Philosophy
Political factors are a necessary condition for virtually every judicial
appointment, even though - fortunately - they are rarely a sufficient condition.
Although the overwhelming majority ofjudicial nominees are qualified by reason
of intellect, experience and character, countless attorneys who are well qualified are
never considered for a judgeship because they lack the requisite political
connections or a political philosophy that appeals to the president. Because, to
paraphrase the old saw about judicial decisions, federal judges are "not immaculate
conceptions brought by storks," it is absurd to argue that the pungent political
aromas that surrounded the nomination process should suddenly vanish into an
antiseptic confirmation process.7
Indeed, one could argue that political considerations at the confirmation level
are more edifying than are political considerations at the appointment level.
Senators who make sincere objections to the political philosophies of nominees are
attempting to ensure that the judge's decisions will conform to the senators' notions
of what is best for the nation. In contrast, the political considerations that affect
nominations are rarely so principled. Although the president and the home state
senators may try to select nominees whose political views will result in judicial
decisions which benefit the nation, they also take account of less high-minded
7' The extent to which ideology should be a factor in the confirmation was the subject of
hearings during the summer of 2001 before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts. Some experts took a relatively broad view of
the role of ideology in confirmation. Professor Tribe, for example, testified that nominees
should persuade senators that their "experience, writings, speeches, decisions, and actions
affirmatively demonstrate not only the exceptional intellect and wisdom and integrity that
greatness as a judge demands but also the understanding of and commitment to those
constitutional rights and values and ideals that the Senator regards as important for the
republic to uphold." Laurence Tribe, Ideology & Judicial Nominations, available at 2001
WL 21756494. Similarly, Professor Levinson contended that "ideology should not be
irrelevant even when considering a nominee to a federal district or circuit court." Sanford
Levinson, Confirmation Process in Review, available at 2001 WL 26186172. Dean Kmiec,
however, warned that "[t]he Senate should not place the burden of proving partisan
compatibilityuponjudicial nominees." Douglas W. Kmiec, Confirmation Process in Review,
available at 2001 WL 26186175. Professor Rotunda argued that "the history of the
nomination and confirmation process supports the Senate's current practice of focusing on
a nominee's character and ability to follow the law rather than his or her putative political
ideology and reputed view on particular politically hot topics of the day." Ronald D.
Rotunda, Confirmation Process in Review, available at 2001 WL 26186173. Senator
Schumer, who convened the hearings, stated in an interview in July 2001 that "[w]e ought
to have ideology out there. Should it be the sole dominant factor? No .... But should it be
part of it? Yes." NBC News: Meet the Press, (NBC television broadcast, July 1,2001), 2001
WL 24103331.
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political goals such as personal connections, party service, and the repayment of
personal and political favors. Surely it is more acceptable for a senator to vote
against a nominee on the basis of his views on capital punishment than for the
president to nominate someone because he is the golfing buddy of a senator who is
a member of the president's political party.
Accordingly, elimination or minimization of politics at the confirmation stage
should require elimination of politics at the appointment stage. If the Senate should
not make political inquiries about a nominee, then the home state senators and the
President should also be blind to the political connections of the nominee and
should select nominees on the basis of anonymous civil service examinations,
followed by background checks to ensure that the nominee has not engaged in
criminal activities.
As lower federal judges are supposedly bound to follow precedent, their
ideologies are sometimes said to be less important than those of Supreme Court
justices, who often encounter issues in which precedent is unclear and who face no
embarrassing reversals if they ignore or overturn precedent. Federal judges
themselves tend to deny that they have any significant discretion in deciding cases,74
an opinion echoed routinely by nominees at confirmation hearings. In reality,
however, lower federal court judges also often encounter issues on which the law
is unclear and therefore have much discretion in fashioning the law in a manner in
which their own predilections and philosophies inevitably influence their
decisions."S As Professor Yackle has observed:
The extent to which lower courts are genuinely bound by higher court
precedents in close cases may be overstated. Only rarely is a precedent
truly on 'all fours' with the case at bar, and more rarely still can the lower
court anticipate that its decision will be reviewed - given the physical
limits of most appellate courts. Indeed, there is ample evidence that lower
court judges feel free to treat precedents as merely elements of the rich mix
7 For example, Senior Judge John Keenan of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York recently stated that:
I have about as much policymaking right as my two and a half year old grandson.
Every once in awhile, in a certain case, maybe, I can go one way or the other way.
That may come up once out of about 2,500 cases on a summary judgment motion
or on a motion to suppress where credibility is at issue.
Panel Discussion, Judicial Efficiency: Is There a Vacancy Crisis Threatening the
Nation's Judicial System?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 33, 53-54 (1998).
71 See e.g., Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings ofLopez,
Or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 200
Wis. L. REv. 369 (2000).
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of materials that must be considered in resolving a new dispute. 6
Despite the many factors that militate against political extremism in the lower
judiciary, there is no doubt that ideology influences decision-making. If lower
federal judges are merely receptacles for precedent, then one can only wonder why
so many presidential administrations and so many public interest groups have taken
such pains to screen the ideologies ofjudicial nominees. Have so many politically
sophisticated persons completely misunderstood how judges decide cases? I think
not. Even though fidelity toward precedent discourages the politicization ofjudicial
decision-making and substantially ameliorates the differences between judges
appointed by different administrations, no one denies that the judges appointed by
President Reagan are different from those appointed by President Clinton. Even
though these differences may not manifest themselves in the large majority of cases,
they can have a powerful cumulative impact even if they affect only a small number
of cases in which judges have considerable discretion. The argument that ideology
is irrelevant merely because judges of different political persuasions tend to decide
most cases in the same manner is as misleading as are overwrought depictions of
Reagan's judicial nominees as a horde of crypto-fascists and Clinton's nominees as
a troupe of loony leftists. Although the law changes incrementally, even glacially,
it does change, and the political predilections of the judges who make the often
subtle rulings that slowly shift the law in new directions are tremendously
important.
2. Assessing a Nominee's General Political and Judicial Philosophies
Because ideology inevitably influences even lower federal judges, the Senate
should, and does, inquire into the general political and judicial philosophies of
nominees. Unfortunately, the Senate's inquiries, particularly its oral questions, too
often are superficial and encourage rote responses that do not seriously probe the
nominee's views.
Between 1995 and 2001, when the nominees of a Democratic president faced
a committee with a Republican majority, "judicial activism" became the focal point
for Republican senators who wanted to assess the ideological predilections of
nominees. Although this emphasis on judicial activism sometimes seemed like a
fixation, inquiries about judicial activism can provide useful insights into the
manner in which judges would approach their duties.
In the context of the committee hearings during the Clinton Administration,
"judicial activism" had a highly political meaning. While the phrase "judicial
activism" is capable of many complex definitions," its meaning was relatively
76 Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L. REV. 273, 310
n. 124 (1989).
" The exchanges between senators and nominees amply illustrate the inherent difficulties
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simple and clear in the context of a confirmation process in which a "conservative"
Republican Senate reviewed the nominees of a "liberal" Democratic president. In
this context, "judicial activism" meant decisions that advanced the broad political
goals of liberals and Democrats, particularly the rights of women, racial minorities,
and criminal defendants. Because senators often prefer to shun direct discussion
of legal issues affecting these groups - probably for fear of alienating constituents
- discussions ofjudicial restraint sometimes became something of a charade. All
too often, senators asked perfunctory questions about a straw man called "judicial
activism" and nominees provided ritualistic answers that often appeared to tell
Republican senators only what they presumably wanted to hear. In responding to
oral and written questions about judicial activism, nominees almost unfailingly
abjured activism and pledged their fealty to judicial restraint. In a typical response,
one nominee declared that "it would be wrong for a judge to ignore precedent, stare
decisis, to usurp the power of the legislative branch of government. Judges are not
there to make law. We are there to interpret and apply law." '78 Similarly, nominees
routinely averred that the plain language of the Constitution should be the starting
point for any constitutional interpretation.79
As circuit judges are not necessarily bound by the precedents of their own
circuits, questions to circuit court nominees about their fidelity to precedent are
perhaps more meaningful than are questions to district judges about whether they
would abide by the precedents of higher courts. Here again, however, denials of
judicial activism tend to be perfunctory. Unwilling to risk the potentially fatal
stigma ofjudicial activism, circuit court nominees routinely have insisted that they
would not even consider altering the precedent of their circuit. For example, one
nominee averred that "I do not foresee any precedent, any situation that would
justify a circuit court judge overturning the prior decision o[f] his or her own
circuit. '
During a number of hearings, Republican senators have practically invited rote
responses to questions about fidelity to precedent insofar as they have asked panels
of several nominees to respond seriatim. For example, nominees at one hearing
gave the following responses to Senator Hatch's inquiry about whether they were
of defining "judicial activism," much less identifying this supposed virus in nominees. For
example, Senator Ashcroft expressed fear that repeated assurances by one group ofnominees
that they would follow Supreme Court precedent suggested that they were elevating Supreme
Court precedents over the Constitution. Upon further questioning, the nominees naturally
insisted that they would follow the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 1997
Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 507 (questioning by Sen. Ashcroft of Judge Kennedy &
Mr. Droney).
78 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 126; see also 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra
note 20, at 753; id. at 873-74.
79 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 46 (testimony of Margaret M. Morrow); 1997
Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 10 (testimony of Marjorie 0. Rendell).go 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 675.
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"all committed to following existing precedent" with regard to affirmative action:
Mr. KING. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. RAWLINSON. I am, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SLEET. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. DAWSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Judge LIPEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman.8
Similarly, Democratic senators have sometimes relied on rote responses in an
apparent effort to assuage the fears of Republicans. The following is a typical
exchange:
Sen. LEAHY. And I understand.. . that you do not plan to legislate from
the bench?
Judge MILLER. That is correct, Senator Leahy.
Mr. PRATT. Yes.
Sen. LEAHY. Ms. Morrow.
Ms. MORROW. Absolutely.
Sen. LEAHY. And you understand the inherent limitations the Constitution
places, especially for district judges?
Judge MILLER. Yes, Senator.
Mr. PRATT. I do.
Sen. LEAHY. Ms. Morrow.
Ms. MORROW. Yes, Senator.82
Even the boldest nominee hardly can be blamed for eschewing nuanced remarks
if her reply would be immediately compared with those of her fellow nominees.
Seated alongside nominees who dutifully denied that a lower federal judge has the
slightest discretion in applying the law, a nominee who dared to suggest that such
a judge is more than a marionette of the Supreme Court would call forth the
Committee's wrathful scrutiny and almost certainly jeopardize her confirmation.
Clinton nominees often seemed so eager to convince Republican senators that
they would abide by precedent that their answers sometimes may have gone too far
even for the most conservative senators. In an amusing irony, Senator Hatch gently
reproved six nominees who rotely provided negative responses to Hatch's question
about whether they would have "any difficulty" enforcing capital punishment.
Hatch explained that he himself "would have difficulty enforcing the death penalty"
because he "would want it used very sparingly." 3
While pledges to follow precedent are appropriate on their face, they fail to
81 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 665.
82 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 26.
83 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 39.
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consider what happens in the fairly common situation in which the law is uncertain,
incomplete, or ambiguous. As Hatch correctly reminded one group of nominees
who had insisted that they would only rely on precedent, "you are going to find
cases ... of first impression and you are going to have to make the law in those
cases."
84
Because rote renunciations of judicial activism and promises to follow
precedent provide no insights into the nominee's philosophies, senators could
perhaps more usefully ask what a nominee would do if there were no precedent.
Senator Hatch asked precisely this question during at least one recent hearing, but
the answers were so vague as to reveal very little. After explaining that she rarely
had been faced with this problem because "there is such an enormous body of law,"
one nominee said that she would look to the "plain language of the statute" and
"look through any other analogous analyses that have been made by the circuit
courts and the Supreme Court and apply those."85 Although this answer failed to
explain how the nominee would approach a common law question of first
impression or how she would draw analogies, the senator did not press the point
with this nominee or with two other nominees who provided similarly opaque
responses.86
Moreover, counter-majoritarianism was a taboo topic among the Clinton
nominees who faced a Republican Judiciary Committee. In discussing the role of
the federal courts in response to written and oral questions, only a daring handful
of nominees even hinted that the federal courts can or should exercise the counter-
majoritarian function which these courts have performed so actively for the past
sixty years. In reciting their monotonous paeans to judicial restraint and pledging
to dispense justice like robots, Clinton nominees almost completely omitted any
reference to the rich tradition in which federal courts have protected "discrete and
insular minorities," lubricated clogged political processes, and guarded against
violations of fundamental rights by other branches of the federal government and
the states.
Similarly, Clinton nominees tended either to ignore or to abjure the concept of
a "living Constitution." Insisting that the text of the Constitution and the intent of
the Framers provide the sole basis for constitutional interpretation, most nominees
seem to have forgotten the ancient doctrine that the Constitution must, in the
language of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., be adapted to the "felt necessities of the
times."87  One nominee, for example, expressed disagreement with Justice
Brennan's observation that the ultimate question of constitutional interpretation is
84 Id. at 181.
8" Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., May 25, 2000
(testimony of Beverly B. Martin) [hereinafter May 25, 2000 Hearings].
86 Id. (testimony of Jay A. Garcia-Gregory and Laura Taylor Swain).
87 OLIVER WENDELL HOLM ES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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what the "words and the text mean in our time."88 Likewise, other nominees appear
to have advocated strict adherence to the text of the Constitution. A few Clinton
nominees, however, have been so bold as to acknowledge that the Constitution is
not a static document.8 9
Senatorial questions about the fluidity of the Constitution, like so many other
queries at confirmation hearings, often brush aside subtleties. Questions about
constitutional interpretation often imply that there is no middle ground between
wanton activism and wooden adherence to the text.90 Given the choice between
these two stark alternatives, it is hardly surprising that nominees have opted to
endorse strict construction. On the rare occasions in which senators have more
deeply probed the thinking of nominees, the nominees have generally taken a more
nuanced view of the judicial role. For example, when Republican Senator Ashcroft
asked Judge Stanley Marcus whether rights could "suddenly appear in the
Constitution" or whether judges can "amend the Constitution," Marcus naturally
assured Ashcroft of his fidelity to the text.9' In response to additional questioning
by Democratic Senator Durbin, however, Marcus affirmed his fidelity to U.S.
Supreme Court decisions which have found an implicit right to privacy in various
amendments. 92
Another problem is that senatorial questions are sometimes phrased in an
ambiguous manner that permits ambiguous answers. For example, Senator Ashcroft
asked some nominees to name "the single most important right not protected by the
Constitution." 93 If this question was designed to determine whether a nominee is
an "activist" who would create rights which are not specifically spelled out in the
Constitution, the question is unlikely to ferret out such activism. Even the most
exotic rights discovered by an "activist"judge would need to have their origin in the
Constitution. Legally protected "rights" by definition find their origin in the
Constitution. Therefore, a nominee who believed in the expansion of constitutional
rights could reply with perfect candor that there are no rights which the Constitution
does not protect.94 Indeed, the seemingly "restrained" response that there are no
u' 1997 Hearings, Part 2, supra note 21, at 354-55(response of Judge Sonia Sotomayor
to question from Sen. Thurmond).
"' Id. (testimony of Ronald Lee Gilman). Mr. Gilman stated "[t]he words are important
and I think that if the Constitution is to have enduring meaning, those concepts obviously
have to be applied to current circumstances."
" For example, Senator Ashcroft asked Judge Ann L. Aiken whether "there are rights that
do not exist in the Constitution which.., exist independent of the Constitution." 1997
Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 688. There is a general consensus that rights do not exist
independent of the Constitution, this question evaded the real issue of the extent to which
judges may invoke rights which are not explicitly specified in the Constitution.
9' Id. at 681-82.
92 Id. at 682.
9' 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 245.
94 Id.
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rights which the Constitution does not protect alternatively could be read as an
"activist" answer to the extent that the nominee regarded the constitutional
protection of rights as unbounded. If this question was designed to gauge how
expansively the nominee would interpret the Constitution, the question ought to ask
whether the nominee believes that there are rights which have not been recognized
by the courts and/or rights which are not specifically prescribed by the text of the
Constitution.95
In a few instances, senators have moved beyond shibboleths about judicial
activism to ask questions that more specifically test a nominee's views about the
role of a judge. For example, some senators have inquired about nominees'
attitudes toward structural injunctions.96 Although nominees have naturally assured
senators that they disfavor expansive use of structural injunctions and have been
vague about the circumstances that might require such an injunction, these
questions have at least afforded an opportunity for dialogue about judicial activism
that moves a step or two beyond generalities. Similarly, the Committee has asked
circuit court nominees whether they would regard themselves as bound by the
precedents of their own circuit on matters on which the Supreme Court has not
spoken.97 Senators have also tried to ascertain the extent to which nominees would
use Rule 11 as a basis for discouraging lawyers from advancing novel legal
theories." Asked by Senator Thurmond whether the courts should try to correct
social problems on which the legislature had failed to act, Judge James G. Carr
replied that "the last thing any court should be doing is acting either in response to
its perception of some social problem or its personal view or outlook as to how
things ought to be."'99 Senators have sometimes asked intelligent questions about
judicial philosophy, such as whether constitutional rights may "grow or shrink with
" Senator Ashcroft provided this type of clarity in one ofhis written questions to Richard
Paez: "What in your view, is the single most important right not protected by the
Constitution? In other words, are there any rights that as a policy matter you would like to
be protected by the Constitution, but, in your view, are nonetheless not secured by the
Constitution?" 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 624 (responses of Richard Paez to
questions from Sen. Ashcroft).
96 See 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 33 (questioning by Sen. Ashcroft of Jeffrey
T. Miller & Robert W. Pratt).
97 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 118. In response to Senator Kohl's question
about whether "an appellate judge should overturn precedent within his or her own circuit,"
Stewart replied that he would regard himself as bound by the precedent of the Fifth Circuit
unless he joined in an en banc reversal of precedent. Id.
98 Id. at 118, 526; 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 727 (response of Judge
Katherine Sweeney Hayden to questions From Sen. Thurmond). For example, Judge Carl E.
Stewart stated that Rule 11 "requires a balancing test" that recognizes the need to control
litigation but that allows for the growth of the law. 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at
118. Batts expressed hope that she would be able to distinguish "between novel and
frivolous" litigation, examining each case on its facts. Id. at 526.
99 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 122.
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changing historical circumstances' °° and whether substantive due process is a
legitimate constitutional doctrine.'0 '
In responding to questions about activism, a handful of nominees have offered
thoughtful comments about the judicial decision making process that might have
helped the Senate to evaluate how the nominee would approach the task ofjudging.
Diana G. Motz, for example, expressed her opinion that "the loose dicta that passes
for enunciation of general principles does not really help litigants in future cases.
. Moreover, often dicta simply confuses litigants and less sophisticated lawyers
into following a course that... a court may find ill conceived."' °2 In addition to
standard general rejections of activism, Jeffrey T. Miller thoughtfully pointed out
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and remand of state
claims to state courts are means by which federal courts may exercise restraint.' 3
Although Republican senators generally have sought assurances that nominees
would follow precedent, Senator Smith has tested attitudes on abortion by asking
how nominees would respond if Dred Scott were a controlling precedent. °4 Given
this challenging question, some nominees have provided answers that were not
completely perfunctory. Marsha Berzon, for example, pointed out that there might
be more leeway for judicial discretion in interpreting a federal statute than in
interpreting the Constitution because "Congress can alter the statute more easily
than it can alter the Constitution."'0 5 Similarly, Robert E. Katzmann pointed out the
Supreme Court would have more warrant to overturn precedent than would an
appellate court. '" Most nominees merely have insisted that they would follow even
such a repugnant precedent.' 7
For a while during the 1990's, the questionnaire also asked nominees to discuss
their views about "judicial activism," including dilution of standing and ripeness
requirements and substitution of a "problem-solving" approach for one of grievance
resolution.' 8 It hardly needs to be said that most Clinton nominees duly recited the
"o 1999 Hearing Part 1, supra note 25, at 138 (question by Sen. John Ashcroft).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1003.
103 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 93.
,o" Id. at 30. Senator Smith's question apparently was designed to test the nominees'
attitude toward Roe v. Wade. See id. at 31.
o Id. at 30.
'06 Id. at 31.
107 Id. at 168 (testimony of Raymond C. Fisher & Maryanne Trump Barry); id. at 391-92
(responses of Anne C. Williams to questions from Sen. Smith).
,08 The questionnaire elicited the nominee's response to the following statement:
The role of the Federal judiciary within the Federal government, and within society
generally, has become the subject of increasing controversy in recent years. It has
become the target of both popular and academic criticism that alleges that the
judicial branch has usurped many of the prerogatives of other branches and levels
of government.
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orthodox response presumably demanded by the committee's catechism, affirming
the creed of judicial restraint and abjuring the heresy of judicial activism."°9
Because it referred to some of the most profound political and jurisdictional issues,
the question could have called forth book-length responses. In an apparent
recognition that anything that they say might be held against them, most nominees
limited themselves to very brief averments of their fidelity to judicial restraint,
submitting statements that rarely exceeded three short paragraphs and which
typically were shorter than the lengthy, multi-part question. "0
Some of the characteristics of this "judicial activism" have been said to include:
a. A tendency by the judiciary toward problem-solution rather than grievance-
resolution;
b. A tendency by the judiciary to employ the individual plaintiff as a vehicle
for the imposition of far-reaching orders extending to broad classes of
individuals;
c. A tendency by the judiciary to impose broad affimative duties upon
government and society;
d. A tendency by the judiciary toward loosening jurisdictional requirements
such as standing ripeness; and
e. A tendency by the judiciary to impose itself upon other institutions in the
manner of an administrator with continuing oversight responsibilities.
1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 50.
'09 For example,, Margaret M. Morrow declared that:
[t]he separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to American jurisprudence. The
Constitution carefully spells out the delicate balance of powers that characterizes
the unique American system. The role of the judiciary is to decide cases in
controversy, not to legislate or make policy. Thus, it is inappropriate for courts to
usurp legislative or executive powers by interpretation that disregards the
constraints of the Constitution, precedent, statute or legislative intent (including
Congressional intent to leave states or the executive branch with the freedom to
exercise reasonable judgment in interpreting and administering particular acts).
1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 86; see also Thomas L. Jipping, Judicial Legacy in
the Political Balance, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at B4 (expressing frustration over the
vagueness of such answers, Jipping complained that the "questionnaire remains as useless
as ever for determining the kind ofjudge nominees will be").
1o Eric L. Clay provided a fairly typical response:
I believe it is the responsibility of the legislative branch of government to determine
governmental policy, and it is primarily the task of the courts to interpret the
legislative intent in conformity with the statutory framework as established by
legislators. In general, it is not necessary for the courts to issue broad
pronouncements that are not dictated or required by the issues and facts framed by
the specific matters before the court. The U.S. Court of Appeals is bound by the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and where the Supreme Court has not
spoken on a matter, in most instances, some guidance has been provided by either
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A few Clinton nominees dared to admit, however, that lower federal judges
actually have some discretion in their decisions. For example, William F. Downes
stated that "[o] ften, there are conflicting rules of law which may or may not apply
to a given factual situation,""' and Arthur J. Gajarsa acknowledged that "[a] judge
cannot be entirely automatic in the performance of his or her duties."' 2 Similarly,
Judge Stanley Marcus tempered his expressions of fidelity to judicial restraint by
admitting that "[t]his is not to say that broad judicial remedies are always wrong.
.. Where such remedies are clearly necessary to the vindication of fundamental
constitutional rights, they may be unavoidable."' " Paul Borman stated that "if a
significant constitutional issue of far-reaching import comes before the Court, the
judge should not avoid fulfilling the obligation to render justice, and if there is no
binding precedent, to interpret the Constitution.""' Some nominees even more
boldly stated that judicial "activism" may be warranted when the other branches of
government derogated constitutional rights.'
A few nominees even dared to point out the hypocrisy of much of the criticism
of "judicial activism." Downes, for example, stated that "[s]ometimes, critics of the
federal courts define the legitimate exercise ofjudicial discretion as activism when
the decision of the court does not suit them. 'Judicial activism' is often in the eyes
of the beholder.""'6 Similarly, Collins candidly observed that much of the criticism
of the courts may "be based upon disagreements with either individual rulings or the
legislative decision to increase the court's jurisdiction in the area of Constitutional
civil rights."' Likewise, Algenon L. Marbley stated that allegations of judicial
activism arise partly from growing public expectations of the judiciary, which "are
the legislature, or other courts.
1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 311.
... 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 1259.
112 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 352.
113 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 747-48 (response to questionnaire).
114 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 39.
"f' Clarence Sundram, for example, declared that:
Federal courts are sometimes criticized for 'judicial activism' and for prescribing
sweeping and affirmative duties upon governments by the very governments that
have been found to violate the laws or the constitutional rights of citizens, that have
been afforded the opportunity to fashion acceptable remedies and have either
refused to do so, or have done so and then failed to implement them. In these cases,
unless the federal court is willing to deny a remedy for the legal or constitutional
violation, it is forced to craft a remedy itself or call upon experts in the particular
field to assist in doing so.
1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 704.
'", 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 1259.
... Id. at 51.
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now required to review more administrative agency decisions, to interpret statutes
containing remedies unknown at common law, and fashion class action relief.", "
Even though the answers to questions about activism may seem rote, there may
be some benefits to asking general questions about fidelity to precedent, separation
of powers, and other fundamental issues, if only as a way of reminding nominees
of their importance. As Senator DeWine explained before he asked nominees about
their respect for precedent:
Sometimes people may wonder why these questions are asked. I think that
it is necessary to ask them, even if we can pretty much figure out what your
answers are going to be. I think it is important to have it on the record, and
I think it is important in a public hearing to have these questions asked and
answered.19
3. Comments About Issues that Nominees Might Need to Adjudicate
Perhaps one of the reasons why senators have asked so many questions about
judicial activism and other issues of process is that nominees are so reluctant to
discuss substantive legal issues. Like Supreme Court nominees, lower federal
nominees should refrain from providing testimony that suggests how they would
rule in a particular manner on a particular issue. Such testimony could require the
judge to recuse herself pursuant to the federal recusal statute, which provides in part
that "[a]nyjustice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' 20
Moreover, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a judge from
making "any public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect" the
outcome of "a fair trial or hearing."'' This rule may apply even to nominees who
are not yet judges.' 2 The Code also provides that a "judge should abstain from
public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should
require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and
control."' 23 At least one nominee has expressed concern that the judicial conduct
rule which prohibits judges from commenting on pending cases might apply to
judicial nominees. 24
"1 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 568 (statement of Marbley).
"1 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1033 (remarks of Sen. DeWine).
120 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
12 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (2000).
122 Steven Lubet, Confirmation Ethics: President Reagan 's Nominees to the UnitedStates
Supreme Court, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 229,246-59 (1990); Steven Lubet, Advice and
Consent: Questions and Answers, 84 NW. U. L. REv. 879, 880-85 (1990).
23 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(6) (2000).
124 1997 Hearings Part /, supra note 6, at 506 (testimony of Judge Anthony W. Ishii).
Judge Ishii explained that he would prefer to "err on the side of caution" in refusing to
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Although lower federal court nominees are less inclined than Supreme Court
nominees to completely refuse to answer questions on the grounds that the issues
may come before them in court, they generally avoid answers that would suggest
that they are pre-judging any issue. At the very least, judicial nominees who are
already federal or state judges are constrained from discussing issues that might
appear before them prior to their confirmation or if they are not confirmed. Indeed,
the Judiciary Committee's questionnaire recognizes the danger of bias from such
discussion in its question asking the nominee whether "anyone involved in the
process of selecting you as a judicial nominee discussed with you any specific case,
legal issue or question in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as asking
... how you would rule on such case, issue, or question."
25
Accordingly, nominees generally refrain from making comments at
confirmation hearings about cases that are presently pending before them if they are
judges. For example, Judge Richard A. Paez made it clear that he would not discuss
his award of a preliminary injunction against an anti-panhandling ordinance because
the case was still pending before him.'26 Similarly, nominees have properly refused
to comment on cases that are presently subjudice in other courts. For example,
when Clarence Sundram was asked whether a court could properly invalidate
California's anti-affirmative action Proposition 209, Sundram properly limited
himself to generalities about judicial review since Proposition 209 was being
challenged in the federal courts.'27 Moreover, nominees sometimes have invoked
the Canons in refusing to discuss specific legal issues because they might need to
adjudicate the same issue. For example, Judge Clarence Cooper refused to express
an opinion about Senator Kohl's legislation to prohibit judges from allowing
confidentiality orders when the information sought to be made secret relates to
public health and safety.'28 Similarly, several nominees have refused to offer an
discuss cases which come before him on the state bench, or on the federal bench if he were
confirmed as a U.S. district judge. Id.
125 Questionnaire, supra note 4.
,26 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 329, 331. Judge Paez acknowledged that he
was aware of the public problems created by panhandling. Id. at 331.
127 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 518.
128 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 125. Cooper explained that:
I don't want to prejudge what might be before me as a Federal district court judge,
and that very issue might arise and I don't want to commit myself at this time. I can
only say that I would balance the competing interests and make a decision that I
think would be fair to the parties involved, but I don't want to commit myself to a
position at this time.
Id. See also 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 677 (refusing to answer question about
federal sentencing guidelines because "those issues that I might be speculating on now could
conceivably come before me in the form of a challenge to the guidelines, no matter what form
they might take.").
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opinion about the constitutionality of the capital punishment of minors and the
Partial-Birth Abortion Act.'29 Respectful of these ethical considerations, senators
have assured nominees that questions about specific legal issues are designed to test
the way in which they approach issues rather than to elicit predictions of how they
would actually rule.'30
Many nominees have been similarly reticent or opaque even in response to
questions that do not suggest how they would rule in specific cases. In many
instances, nominees have provided responses which have been so perfunctory that
they are meaningless. Instead of providing direct responses to queries about
specific legal issues, nominees likewise tend to beg the questions of senators.
Nominees provide answers that recite the general procedures by which the judge
would decide an issue, without offering any pronouncement on how the judge
would actually apply such procedures in a given case, much less how the judge
would decide substantive issues. Asked to explain how difficult it is for a statute
to survive analysis under a strict scrutiny standard of review, nominees have limited
themselves to the hornbook statement that such legislation must be narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.' Asked about the
constitutionality of various types of controversial legislation, many nominees have
limited themselves to an acknowledgment that there is a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of any legislation. For example, numerous nominees have finessed
questions about the constitutionality of a ban on partial birth abortions by pointing
out that all legislation is entitled to the presumption of constitutionality.' 32 Asked
to express their views on the constitutionality of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
and the Habeas Corpus Reform Act, nominees likewise have replied that they are
presumed to be constitutional.' 3 Similarly, M. Margaret McKeown stated that any
judicial interference with an initiative "needs to be with very, very, extreme
caution."'3 4 Another nominee responded to a question about the constitutionality
.29 See 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 72 (Stephan R. Underhill refused to
comment on constitutionality of Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act in part "because it might
come before me... if I were to be confirnmed."; 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 503
(testimony of Katherine Sweeney Hayden & Judge Ishii); id. at 504 (testimony of Harold
Kennedy, Jr.).
13I d. at 509 (remarks of Sen. Torricelli).
'3' 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 23, at 301 (testimony of Mr. Shea); id. at 306 (Judge
Jeremy D. Fogel).
13' E.g., 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 242 (responses of Richard K. Eaton to
questions from Sen. Smith); id. at 244 (responses of Ellen Degal Huvelle to questions from
Sen. Smith); id. at 245 (responses of Charles A. Pannell, Jr., to questions from Sen. Smith);
id. at 293 (Richard Linn's responses to follow-up questions from Sen. Smith); id. at 296
(responses of Ronald A. Guzman to follow-up questions of Sen. Smith); id. at 299 (Barbara
M. Lynn's response to follow-up questions from Sen. Smith).
"1 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra at note 22, at 264, 279 (testimony of Judge Richard L.
Strauss & Susan Old Molloway).
114 Id. at 21-22.
[Vol. 10: 1
QUESTIONING OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT NOMINEES
of school vouchers by reciting analogous Supreme Court precedents and pointing
out that statutes are presumed to be constitutional.'35
Nominees likewise have not offered insights into their opinions about specific
cases when senators have asked whether they would abide by the precedent of such
decisions, and neither have senators requested such insights. Prime examples are
the perfunctory exchanges between senators and nominees about willingness to
follow the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand v. Pena' by subjecting racial
preferences in federal programs to strict judicial scrutiny.'
Other nominees also have properly contended that they could not comment
about a case without having more information about it. For example, Robert E.
Katzmann blunted Senator Smith's question about the constitutionality of a ban on
partial birth abortion by explaining that "I would really have to evaluate that issue
in the context of a law that is actually passed, and then in terms of a case or a
controversy."' 3 8
The difficulty of achieving meaningful dialogue on complex issues was
illustrated when Senator Kohl asked Judge W. Louis Sands whether he would refuse
' Id. at 140 (responses of Charles Wilson to questions by Sen. Ashcroft). In explaining
their general theory ofjudicial review, nominees have likewise emphasized that all legislation
is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 342 (testimony of Hilda G. Tagle &
Sam A. Lindsay).
116 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (adopting strict scrutiny for affirmative action in federal
government programs).
131 See, e.g., 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1203 (responses to questions asked
by Sen. Sessions by William A. Fletcher). Professor Fletcher replied that "I will follow the
Adarand decision scrupulously, as I will follow all Supreme Court precedent." Id. See also
id. at 1211 (responses of Chester J. Straub to follow-up questions from Sen. Sessions). Mr.
Straub stated that "[y]es, I shall follow Adarand and subject racial classifications to strict
scrutiny." Id. Similarly, the following dialogue occurred at a 1999 hearing:
The CHAIRMAN. Now, will you follow.., the Supreme Court's decisions in
Adarand v. Pena and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson and Company with respect
to affirmative action and other race-based classifications?
Mr. LORENZ. I certainly would follow that Supreme Court case. The strict scrutiny
standard is the highest, and you would have to have any exception to be a very
narrow, tailored and focused decision that would be in a compelling State interest.
I would certainly follow that decision.
The CHAIRMAN. Judge Hurd.
Judge HURD. Yes, I would.
The CHAIRMAN. Judge Buchwald.
Judge BUCHWALD. Absolutely.
Mr. STEWART. Absolutely.
Mr. MARRERO. Yes, Senator.
1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25; at 180.
"' Id. at 33.
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to maintain the confidentiality of settlement agreements in defective product
litigation in order to facilitate public health and safety.'39 After acknowledging a
need to balance privacy expectations with the public interest, Sands explained that
he would not prejudge how he would rule in a particular case but that
I certainly would listen to all of the facts, take into consideration all of the
circumstances on both sides of the case, as I have tried to do in all cases in
the past, and make a decision which I believed was fair and consistent with
the public interest, as well as to abide fully with whatever law did apply. 40
Although Sands' answer was a model of equivocation, one cannot blame him
for failing to provide a more specific response about so subtle a question and one
perhaps should praise him for avoiding ill-considered comment on a complex
subject. Similarly, Senator Metzenbaum's question about whether judges gave too
many suspended sentences was so abstract that Solomon Oliver properly limited his
response to a superfluous pledge that he would treat all defendants fairly.' 4 '
Many questions are virtually impossible for nominees to answer because the
hearings do not provide enough time for a thoughtful exploration of complex issues,
and a thorough discussion would perhaps require a nominee to make statements
which would appear to pre-judge issues that might come before her on the bench.
For example, Senator Torricelli asked a group of several nominees to "quickly"
explain how they would interpret the constitutional scope of congressional re-
districting "mathematically and on a racial basis."'42 When no nominee spoke up,
the committee proceeded to other questions. As Senator Sessions aptly remarked,
"[s]mart group; nobody volunteered."' 43
Even when nominees refuse to discuss issues that might come before them, they
may make general comments that offer insights into the manner in which they
would approach the case. For example, Judge Anthony W. Ishii refused to explain
how he would rule in a case in which a landowner challenged government
environmental limitations on the use of his property, but he assured the Committee
that he would be faithful to the Constitution, statutory law, and decisional
precedent."' Similarly, nominees have sometimes offered other insights into legal
issues without revealing how they would rule. Asked, for example, about the
conflict between free speech and parental responsibility to protect children from
offensive internet communications, Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. expressed hope that
increasingly sophisticated parental screening devices would obviate the
"' 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 132.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 532.
142 1997 Hearings part /, supra note 6, at 510 (remarks of Sen. Torricelli).
141 Id. (remarks of Sen. Sessions).
'44 Id. at 513-14 (testimony of Judge Ishii).
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constitutional dilemma.145
When asked about controversial legal issues, nominees also understandably try
to take refuge in settled law. Asked, for example, whether racial preferences are
constitutional, Paez pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Adarand and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 46 make clear that such preferences must be
subjected to strict scrutiny. 47  Similarly, Bonnie J. Campbell explained that
Adarand "is clearly controlling law. Any remedial statute would have to be very
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling state interest. And any review of that by
a court would apply a strict scrutiny test. I think that's a very, very tough
standard."'' 4 Campbell's promise to follow Adarand was immediately echoed by
three other nominees who were testifying at the same hearing. 49 Nominees at other
hearings have made similarly general responses. 0
Even though nominees are willing to cite judicial decisions, they are rarely
willing to discuss them. For example, Morrow refused to comment on the decision
of U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson in blocking implementation of
California's anti-affirmative action proposition, explaining that she was "not
familiar with the evidence presented to Judge Henderson, with the legal arguments
made by the parties to the action, or with the case law on which Judge Henderson
relied in reaching his decision."' 5' Nominees also have refused to comment about
various politically-charged issues, including school vouchers5 2 and moments of
silence in public schools. 3
Nominees normally have failed to offer more than wooden textbook comments
about Supreme Court precedents about which they have been questioned. Asked
to explain her understanding of United States v. Lopez 54 and United States v.
Morrison, 5 for example, one nominee commented that "the Supreme Court
requires a truly economic activity before Congress can rely on the interstate
commerce clause to pass a law in an area" and that she would "have to follow the
law handed down in those cases.' 56 This response, of course, begged the question
of What may constitute an "economic activity," and no senator attempted to elicit
141 Id. at 280.
146 484 U.S. 1058 (1988).
147 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 324.
148 May 25, 2000 Hearings, supra note 85.
149 Id. (testimony of Jay A. Garcia-Gregory, Beverly B. Martin, & Judge Laura Taylor
Swain).
SO E.g., 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 27-28; id. at 38-39 (testimony of Karen
E. Schreier); id. at 167 (testimony of Raymond C. Fisher & Maryanne Trump Barry).
'' 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 246-47.
,52 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 26 (testimony of M. Margaret McKeown).
' Id. at 29.
'14 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (nullifying the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act).
... 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (nullifying the federal Violence Against Women Act).
356 May 25, 2000 Hearings, supra note 85 (testimony of Campbell).
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any more specific response. In responding to a question about the scope of Lopez,
another nominee similarly explained that "[t]he test to determine if a statute exceeds
the power of Congress to enact under the Commerce Clause is whether the activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce.'"" Another nominee testified that the
death penalty is constitutional because the Court has stated that it is
constitutional.' 8
Asked under what circumstances a federal judge should apply federal common
law, one nominee stated that "[a] federal judge should follow the Supreme Court's
decision in Erie v. Tompkins [sic] .. .and its progeny."'" 9 Asked in a written
question to state his opinion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, another nominee
replied that "Rule 11 is an important tool for use in the appropriate case. It would
be appropriate in a frivolous case."' 60
Senators often could do more to elicit more specific responses. One nominee
replied to a senator's query about how RICO might be used more effectively by
explaining that "RICO, as it stands, is a powerful deterrent to white-collar criminal
activities because it has been used by prosecutors and by the private bar to bring
cases that have potentially ruinous consequences to individuals, and I think it serves
that purpose admirably."'' Rather than encourage the nominee to propose
constructive suggestions for the improvement of what he regarded as an effective
statute, the senator went on to ask a question on an entirely different subject.
Similarly, Kohl asked a thoughtful question to a nominee who had served as a
magistrate judge about "how to improve magistrates' current role in the judicial
system," but Kohl failed to press for a more responsive answer after the nominee
merely replied that he had been well treated as a magistrate by the district judges.'62
In other instances, senators fail to press nominees to explain provocative statements
that cry out for additional comment. For example, when Jerome B. Friedman
replied to Senator Ashcroft's question about the viability of the Tenth Amendment
by explaining that he had "no problem" with the Tenth Amendment's application
to "very limited areas," Ashcroft failed to ask the nominee to identify such areas.'6a
Asked whether they would apply the Second Amendment to the states, four
nominees merely assured the committee that they would seek guidance from
Supreme Court decisions.'" Since the Court's relevant decisions are few, old, and
'" 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 139.
158 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 27 (testimony of M. Margaret McKeown).
'5 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 718 (reply of Anthony T. Droney).
'60 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1015 (reply to questions of Sen. Thurmond
by Arthur J. Tamow).
161 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 9.
162 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 121.
163 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 689.
" May 25, 2000 Hearings, supra note 85 (testimony of Campbell, Garcia-Gregory,
Martin, & Swain). Similarly, a nominee at another hearing explained that he would look to
Supreme Court precedent and "the plain language of the Second Amendment as starting
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unclear, this would have provided an excellent opportunity for Senator Hatch to
finally call the bluff of nominees who take refuge in the Supreme Court and to try
to probe the opinions of the nominees on this subject. 6 5 Hatch asked no follow-up
questions.
This question, however, might have been objectionable because it was too
hypothetical. When asked about how they would rule in hypothetical cases in
which the law is unsettled, nominees have wisely tended to explain that they would
need to study the issue. For example, Ishii and Hayden properly refused to assure
Senator Hatch of how they would rule in a case involving the constitutionality of
affirmative action by a private employer. Judge Ishii pointed out that the issue had
not been settled by the Supreme Court's decision inAdarand, ' and Judge Kennedy
agreed, explaining that the lack of any settled Supreme Court precedent "would
require me to search the law and to decide the question."'6 7 Since part of the
reluctance of nominees to speak freely about issues appears to arise out of a desire
to avoid alienating senators, nominees can sometimes satisfy liberals and
conservatives alike by responding to questions about the same issue from senators
of different parties. Some of the more liberal senators have sometimes prodded
nominees who have provided "conservative" responses to questions from
conservative senators to acknowledge the "liberal" side of issues. After Christina
A. Snyder assured Senator Sessions in response to his question that there is no
constitutional right to sleep in parks,'68 for example, she assured Senator Feingold
in response to his questions that persons who sleep in parks have the same
constitutional and legal rights of other Americans and that this is one of the reasons
why she had participated in pro bono work on behalf of such persons.'69
Senators generally understand and respect the refusal of nominees to comment
on issues that might come before them on the bench or to challenge settled law.
After Senator Smith expressed disappointment that Marsha S. Berzon and Prof.
points." 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 143 (responses of Charles Wilson to
questions from Sen. Smith). Likewise, another recent nominee explained that he would
follow the text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, and the precedents of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 239 (responses of Ronald M. Gould to questions from Sen. Smith).
165 Questions about interpretations of the Second Amendment would have provided an
especially rich opportunity for probing the views of lower federal court nominees because,
as Professor Denning has pointed out, lower federal judges have exercised a high level of
discretion in interpreting the Second Amendment. See Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple
Cite Be Trusted? Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second
Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 961,969-72,998-1004 (1995-96). As Denning has observed,
"[p]recedent is no obstacle to determined federal courts. This is nowhere better illustrated
that in the Second Amendment cases." Id. at 1002.
'66 515 U.S. 200 (1995); 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 500 (testimony of Judge
Ishii).
267 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 500 (testimony of Harold Kennedy, Jr.).
,68 Id. at 779 (exchange between Sen. Sessions and Christina A. Snyder).
69 Id. at 782 (exchange between Sen. Feingold and Christina A. Snyder).
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Robert A. Katzmann were willing to say that abortion was "wrong," Senator Hatch
rose to their defense, pointing out that their refusal to declare their opinion on
abortion "without hearing all the facts and evidence" was "different from saying
that they would not find that process unconstitutional."'" 0 Hatch added that "I don't
know how they could say much more than that at this point."''
The reticence of nominees naturally frustrates senators, even though they
understand that it may be proper. At a recent hearing, Senator Smith explained that
"it's awfully frustrating for us in the advise and consent role how we can advise and
consent if we don't even know whether someone would be willing to vote one way
or the other on a precedent or at least conceptually. Not a case, but a precedent, the
issue of precedent."'7 2 Smith went on to complain that:
[W]hen it comes down to really the reason why we want you on the courts,
we can't ask questions because it might be some case before you. Well,
hello? That's the whole point. There may be a case coming up on some of
these issues and we would like to know what your thoughts are, not what
the decision is.' 73
In an effort to try to elicit more revealing responses, Senator Smith sent a
detailed questionnaire to nominees asking whether they believe that it is legitimate
for senators to inquire about the views of nominees on constitutional matters; to
explain the purpose of confirmation hearings; and to ask whether any questions are
off-limits. Although nominees have duly acknowledged that the Senate has the right
to make broad inquiries, they have not retreated from their refusal to respond to
questions that are inappropriate. In response to Smith's question about off-limits
questions, Faith S. Hochberg appropriately stated that:
There are no questions that are off limits for a Senator to ask, and it is the
duty of the nominee to answer any questions posed in such a manner that
his or her answer could never be construed to violate or undermine an
Article I Judge's obligation to follow the Constitution, the precedent of
the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit, and the -laws duly enacted by
Congress. It is important that no nominee give the appearance that he or she
has pre-judged any issue that might come before the court in any future
case or controversy.7 4
70 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 34-35.
I Id. at 35.
17 Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., July 12, 2000.
173 Id.
174 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 395-96 (responses of Faith S. Hochberg to
questions from Sen. Smith).
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4. Personal Opinions
In addition to discussing their judicial philosophies, nominees also are
sometimes asked to reveal their personal opinions about a wide range of social and
political issues. Once again, the Canons of Judicial Conduct may prohibit comment
on pending or impending cases. Accordingly, one recent nominee explained that
her oath as an Oregon state judge prevented her from expressing her personal
beliefs and opinions on matters that reasonably might come before the court,
including abortion and the scope of the Second Amendment.'
When pressed by senators to provide their personal views on controversial
issues, nominees have generally limited themselves to assuring senators that they
would adhere to settled precedent.' Asked whether they would follow even
precedents with which they personally disagreed, nominees have consistently
assured senators that they would faithfully apply the precedent.' 77 Similarly,
nominees have assured senators that they would follow even the precedents of cases
which they believed were wrongly decided.'78 Senators have also asked nominees
whether there is any issue on which they are in such substantial personal
disagreement with the law of the United States that they could not in good
conscience apply the law.'79 In particular, senators have often inquired about
whether a nominee would have moral qualms about following the law on capital
punishment 8 ' and enforcing federal sentencing guidelines. 8' Again, the questions
Id. at 240 (responses of Anna J. Brown to questions from Sen. Smith).
176 An example is the following exchange between Senator Sessions and Margaret M.
Morrow:
Sen. SESSIONS. [C]learly at the time the Constitution was adopted, the framers
•.. contemplated that the death penalty was legitimate under the Constitution.
Would you agree with that philosophy?
Ms. MORROW. I think it is now settled law that that is the case.
Sen. SESSIONS. And would you disagree with the position of Brennan and
Marshall?
Ms. MORROW. Senator, I have to confess to you that I have not read or studied
those opinions, although I am generally familiar with the statement as you make it.
I really could not express an opinion regarding their reasoning. What I can say is
that that reasoning is not the law of the land, and as a trial judge, the law of the land
prevails and the death penalty would be imposed in appropriate cases.
1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 47.
'7 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 11 (testimony of Marjorie 0. Rendell).
'T Id. at 16 (testimony of Bruce W. Kauffman).
179 1997 Hearings Part'1, supra note 6, at 32 (exchange between Sen. Ashcroft and
Donald W. Middlebrooks).
"" Id.; see also id. at 49 (exchange between Sen. Ashcroft and Margaret M. Morrow); id.
at 265 (exchange between Sen. Ashcroft and Eric L. Clay); 1997Hearings Part 2, supra note
21, at 11 (testimony of Marjorie 0. Rendell); id. at 16 (testimony of Bruce W. Kauffman);
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and answers have been perfunctory, as occurred at a hearing in 2000:
Sen. HATCH. Do any of you have any legal or moral beliefs which would
inhibit or prevent you from imposing or upholding a death sentence in any




Judge TAYLOR SWAIN. No. 2
Senator Smith has sometimes asked nominees orally or in writing whether they
personally believe that an unborn child is a human being. Nominees have invariably
refrained from expressing any personal opinion on this issue, explaining that their
role as a judge would be to apply the law without reference to their personal
feelings.8 3 As Berzon testified, "my role as a judge is not to further anything that
I personally believe or don't believe. .. ."I" Similarly, Maryanne Trump Barry
declared that "[m]y personal opinions on any subject are really not relevant, not
important. And to the extent I might interject them, I am acting improperly either
as a district court judge or an appellate judge."' 5 Such responses are appropriate
because comments by a nominee about her personal views concerning highly
sensitive legal issues could be construed as indicating how a nominee would rule
on a particular issue, thereby placing a nominee in jeopardy of violating the Code
of Judicial Conduct and making the nominee vulnerable to a recusal motion if the
issue later came before her in court.
In asking about personal opinions in order to elicit information about judicial
philosophy, senators sometimes have asked nominees to name judicial decisions
that they particularly admire or that they especially question. It is remarkable, but
maybe not surprising, that Clinton nominees tended to express admiration for
decisions in which the Supreme Court circumscribed federal power and criticized
decisions expanding federal power, perhaps, at least in part, because this is what
1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 664 (testimony of Garr M. King, Johnnie B.
Rawlinson, Gregory M. Sleet, Richard T. Dawson, & Kermit Lipez).
"1 1997 Hearings Part ], supra note 6, at 268 (exchange between Sen. Ashcroft and Eric
L. Clay); 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 17 (exchange between Sen. Kohl and
Bruce W. Kauffinan); 1998 Hearings Part 3. supra note 22, at 665 (testimony of Garr M.
King and Johnnie B. Rawlinson).
"I May 25, 2000 Hearings, supra note 85.
183 1999 Hearings Part I, supra note 25, at 32 (testimony of Marsha S. Berzon & Robert
E. Katzmann).
.84 Id. at 32 (testimony of Marsha S. Berzon).
.85 Id. at 169. When Senator Smith continued to press Barry for her personal opinion, she
replied, "Casey is the law that I would look to. If I had a personal opinion - and I am not
suggesting that I do - it is irrelevant because I must look to the law which binds me." Id.
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Republican senators presumably wanted to hear. One nominee praised Lopez,
which held that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in
banning firearms from the vicinity of schools." 6 Several other nominees have
hailed Erie Railroad v. Tompkins'8 for its imposition of restraints on the federal
courts. "'88 One nominee was sure to please Republican senators in naming the
Supreme Court's decision restraining affirmative action inAddrand.8 9 And another
nominee expressed "trepidation" about the Court's decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,9' which revived the doctrine of substantive due process to strike down
a Connecticut ban on the sale of contraceptives. Similarly, the choice of United
States v. Nixon 9' by at least two nominees' might have been pleasing both to
Democratic senators who remembered how the decision led to Nixon's resignation
and Republican senators who recognized the relevance of its holding for
circumscribing the legal immunity of President Clinton.
Asked to name decisions with which they disagreed, nominees have tended to
tilt against the straw men of discredited decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson,93
Korematsu v. United States,94 and Lochner v. New York.' In the wake of
criticisms of Korematsu and Lochner at one hearing, Senator Hatch, with perhaps
unintended humor, reminded the nominees not to "forget Dred Scott.' 196  Other
86 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6 at 275 (testimony of Alan S. Gold).
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 827 (responses of Gregory M. Sleet to Sen.
Ashcroft's follow-up questions).
189 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 15 (testimony of Bruce W. Kauffman).
190 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19' 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (doctrine ofpresidential immunity did not excuse President Nixon
from complying with subpoena issued by the Watergate special prosecutor).
192 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 278 (testimony of Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.);
1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at.263 (questions from Sen. Sessions answered by
Judge Richard L. Young).
191 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statue that required
railroads to provide "equal but separate accommodations" for whites and blacks); 1997
Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 11 (testimony of Marjorie 0. Rendell); id. at 16
(testimony of Bruce W. Kauffman); 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 254 (response
of M. Margaret McKeown to question from Sen. Sessions).
194 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (sustaining the constitutionality of executive order excluding
Japanese-Americans from certain West Coast regions). See 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note
6, at 499 (testimony of Anthony W. Ishii); id. at 769-70 (testimony of Joseph F. Bataillon);
1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 263 (questions from Sen. Sessions answered by
Judge Richard L. Young).
'9' 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (nullifying a New York statute that limited the number of hours that
bakery employees could work); 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 499 (testimony of
Droney); id. at 853 (testimony of George Caram Steeh, III).
96 Id. at 499 (remarks of Sen. Hatch). And indeed some nominees have mentioned Dred
Scott. See 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 16; 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22,
at 300; id. at 305.
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Supreme Court decisions criticized by nominees have included the nullification of
prohibition of advertising by lawyers,'97 and one nominee even expressed
reservations about Marbury v. Madison.9 At least in written questions, however,
some nominees have refused to state their opinion even of such decisions as Dred
Scott and Plessy.99
Of course, the tendency of nominees to refrain from naming controversial cases
is prudent - "a wise decision," as Senator Biden has somewhat ruefully
acknowledged.200 Asked to name their favorite recent decisions, a few Clinton
nominees, however, dared to express approval of some "liberal" decisions,
including the Court's decisions permitting indigents to obtain copies of criminal
files;2°' holding that appeal of a child custody decision cannot be conditioned upon
the capacity to pay;202 and requiring federal prosecutors to provide exculpatory
evidence to the defense.20 a In a few instances, nominees have dared to name
decisions which are examples of judicial activism. One example was Arthur
Gajarsa's reference to Baker v. Carr,'4 the Supreme Court's 1962 decision holding
that the political question doctrine did not bar its adjudication of the
constitutionality of congressional apportionment.20 5
Similarly, when asked to name the judges they most admire or which judge has
most influenced their views on judicial restraint or separation of powers, many
'9' 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 278-79 (criticizing Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)).
98 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 254 (response
of M. Margaret McKeown to question from Sen. Sessions).
'9 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 392 (responses of Anne C. Williams to
questions from Sen. Smith). Williams, a judge, contended that answering the question about
Plessy would constitute an advisory opinion.
200 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 22. When Senator Kohl pointed out that none
of the nominees at a recent hearing had mentioned Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
Senator Biden stated:
I suspect the reason why none of you mentioned Roe, although all of you probably
in your hearts know it is probably one of the most significant decisions, whether you
agreed with it or not, is because you have all been attuned to make sure not to
mention Roe because you know that it is a flash point, the one thing that will get
everyone's interest. I wish one of you had .... At any rate, a wise decision.
Id.
201 Meyer v. City of Chicago, 397 U.S. 1024 (1970). See 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra
note 22, at 853 (testimony of Arthur J. Tamow).
202 MLB v. SLJ, 519 U.S. 102 (1996). See 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 852
(testimony of A. Howard Matz).
203 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 70 (response of Karen Schreier to a general
question, citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
204 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
205 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 271-72, 274 (testimony of Arthur Gajarsa).
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Clinton nominees prudently named jurists who favored judicial restraint even
though their personal political predilections were liberal. Felix Frankfurter. 6 and
Learned Hand2"7 have been popular choices. Hand may be particularly appropriate
choice since he was himself a lower federal judge rather than a Supreme Court
justice. Placed in the more parlous position of naming the present Supreme Court
justice that they most admire, some nominees have prudently professed respect for
all of them.2" Among nominees who have named names, popular choices have
been Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia,2 both of whom were appointed
by President Reagan, whose philosophy of picking judges was so unlike President
Clinton's, but very much like that of the Republicans who controlled the Senate.
Nominees who have selected these justices have generally praised them for
exercising judicial restraint and for displaying other qualities admired by the
Republican members of the committee."' Only very rarely did Clinton nominees
" Id. at 475-76 (responses of Alan S. Gold to questions from Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 728
(response of Judge Katherine Sweeney Hayden to questions from Sen. Ashcroft); 1998
Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 823 (response of Kermit V. Lipez to Sen. Ashcroft's
follow-up questions).
207 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 272 (testimony of Arthur Gajarsa); id. at 279
(testimony of Thomas W, Thrash, Jr.); 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 241
(responses of M. Margaret McKeown to questions from Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 266 (responses
of Judge Richard L. Young to questions from Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 268 (responses of Susan
Oki Molloway to questions from Sen. Ashcroft).
201 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 718 (response of Anthony T. Droney to
questions from Sen. Ashbrook) ("I admire all of the current Supreme Court justices for their
commitment to justice and fairness."); id. at 722 (response of Henry H. Kennedy, Jr. to Sen.
Hatch) ("While I admire each member of the Supreme Court.. . I do not admire any one
Justice more than any other."); id. at 724 (response of Anthony W. Ishii to questions from
Sen. Ashcroft) ("There is no one particular current Supreme Court Justice that I most
admire.").
29 Id. at 730 (response of Clarence J. Sundram to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming
Justice O'Connor); id. at 728 (response of Judge Katherine Sweeney Hayden to questions
from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 1071 (responses of Judge Frank M. Hull to
questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 1073 (response of Robert C.
Chambers to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 273 (responses of
Arthur S. Gajarsa to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming Justice Scalia); 1998 Hearings
Part 3, supra note 22, at 241 (responses of M. Margaret McKeown to questions from Sen.
Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 266 (responses of Judge Richard L. Young to questions
from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 629 (responses of Sam A. Lindsay to questions
from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 631 (responses of Dolissa A. Ridgway to
questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 827 (responses of Gregory M. Sleet
to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 829 (responses of Johnnie B.
Rawlinson to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor); id. at 830 (responses of Garr
M. King to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, naming O'Connor).
20 For example, McKeown stated that O'Connor's "opinions are clear, to the point and
written in plain English, making it easy to understand the holding and the scope of the ruling.
Further, she has emphasized the importance of precedent and stare decisis." 1998 Hearings
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dare to express admiration for "liberal" justices.21 1
When asked to name which law review article or book has most influenced
them, nominees have likewise played it safe. One nominee, for example, selected
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s The Common Law.212 Other nominees have named
Robert Bork's The Tempting of America2" and Alexander M. Bickel's The Least
Dangerous Branch,2 "4 both of which called for greater judicial restraint. Other
nominees have eschewed the mention of any publication with philosophical content
and have named legal treatises.2"
F. Judicial Management Skills
The Senate also has expressed much interest in the management skills of
nominees, particularly district court nominees. Some of the most substantive
exchanges between senators and nominees have concerned issues of judicial
management rather than abstract issues of constitutional adjudication. Management
issues have figured prominently in both oral and written questions. The answers
have been predictable, as virtually all nominees who have been questioned on this
subject have naturally tried to convince the Senate that they share the prevailing
enthusiasm for active judicial management of cases" 6 and for experimentation with
Part 3, supra note 21, at 241 (responses of M. Margaret McKeown to questions from Sen.
Ashcroft). Judge McKeown also expressed appreciation for "the down-to-earth manner" in
which O'Connor approaches her work. Id.
211 For example, Stephan P. Mickle named Thurgood Marshall. Id. at 1216 (responses to
questions from Senator Ashcroft).
'12 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 471 (responses of Eric Clay to questions from
Sen. Ashcroft).
213 Id. at 476 (responses of Alan S. Gold to questions from Sen. Thurmond).
2"4 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note. 22, at 824 (responses of Kermit V. Lipez to
questions from Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 1199 (responses of William A. Fletcher to questions
from Sen. Thurmond).
"5 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 729 (response of Judge Katherine Sweeney
Hayden to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, citing FRANCIS WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS
EXAMINATION); id. at 725 (responses of Judge Ishii to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, citing
LoUIS ELL, HAZARD, & TAIT, PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE, and WALTZ& PARK, EVIDENCE);
1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 242 (responses of M. Margaret McKeown to
questions from Sen. Ashcroft, citing C.A. WRIGHT & R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL); id. at 269 (responses of Susan Old Mollway to questions from Sen.
Ashcroft, citing THOMAS J. MCCARTHYTRADEMARKS ANDUNFAIRCOMPETITION); id. at 625
(responses of Judge Paez to questions from Sen. Ashcroft, citing B.E. WiTKIN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW).
216 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 30 (testimony of Jeffrey T. Miller); id. at 237
(response of Jeffrey T. Miller to written question from Sen. Thurmond); 1997 Hearings Part
2, supra note 21, at 370 (testimony of James S. Gwin); id. at 371 (testimony of Algenon L.
Marbley); id. (testimony of Charles J. Siragusa).
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alternative dispute resolution."' Because judicial management is perhaps more a
matter of will than of technique, nominees are unlikely to espouse any novel ideas
for managing cases. Their answers nevertheless provide at least some insight into
how they would approach docket control. When asked during confirmation
hearings how she would attempt to keep her docket moving expeditiously, Audrey
Collins replied that she would be "an active manager" who would set firm dates for
completion of discovery and trial, work closely with the chief judge and
magistrates, and hold frequent telephonic conferences with attorneys in order to
encourage the narrowing of issues. ' Judge Sands indicated he would try to "make
good use of the magistrates" and explore the potential of arbitration."3 9 Paul
Borman stated that the judge should call lawyers to make sure that a case is
progressing.2 0 Other nominees have similarly expressed their willingness to use
magistrates and modern technology to facilitate docket movement, 221 and to
communicate regularly with attorneys2 2 and-court personnel. 22 1 Sometimes
senators have asked nominees who are already judges about their speed in handling
their caseload, although this information is generally a matter of public record.224
Other questions have involved a diverse array of topics, including: the use of
cameras in courtrooms; 25 attendance by the press atpre-trial depositions; 26 Federal
2,1 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 370 (testimony of James S. Gwin); 1999
Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 178-79 (testimony of Stewart).
2111 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 4-5 (testimony of Audrey Collins).
21"' Id. at 132 (testimony of Judge W. Louis Sands).
220 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 5 (testimony of Paul Borman).
221, 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 680 (testimony of Vanessa Gilmore).
222 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 11-12 (testimony of John Koeltl). Koeltl
stated that he would:
[H]ave a management conference at the beginning of the case, attempt to
understand whether any dispositive motions are going to be in the case, understand
what the discovery plan is in the case, and set realistic deadlines in the case. I would
also explore with the parties when the appropriate time to discuss the settlement or
possible settlement tools that might be available to effect the settlement of the case
if that is appropriate in that case.
Id.
223 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 505 (testimony of Katherine Sweeney
Hayden).
224 1997 Hearings Part I, supra note 6, at 29 (testimony of Jeffrey T. Miller).
225 Id. at 238 (answer of Donald M. Middlebrooks to written question from Sen.
Thurmond); 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 372 (testimony of Charles J. Siragusa);
1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 124 (testimony of Judge Cooper); id. at 680-81
(testimony of Vanessa Gilmore); 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 11 (testimony of
Mr. Koeltl); id. at 14 (testimony of Judge Pooler).
226 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 238 (answer of Donald M. Middlebrooks to
written question from Sen. Thurnond).
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Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ;227 the usefulness of oral arguments in appellate cases;
2
advertising by attomeys; 229 the scope of federal common law;2 a0 means of avoiding
judicial conflicts of interest;' the proper role of law clerks; 232 whether the judge
would hire permanent law clerks;233 the role ofjudges in alleviating criticism of the
legal profession;3 4 the use of court-appointed arbitrators for small cases; 235
methods for remedying the problem of a judge who has a high reversal rate;236 ways
that judges can help prevent discovery conflicts; 237 means of reducing the cost and
complexity of class actions;238 procedures for expediting international litigation;
23 9
prevention of financial conflicts of interest;240 special issues that a judge should
consider in order to ensure fairness to Native Americans;24' and special
considerations for intellectual property cases that a judge should consider in trying
242a case and drafting an opinion.
Senators have also asked nominees about their commitment to pro bono work.
It is hardly surprising that virtually all nominees have emphasized the importance
of pro bono work and the need to encourage it. Much more revealing are answers
to questions about whether it should be mandatory or voluntary. Even nominees
who laud the importance ofpro bono have opposed making mandatory standards.243
Judicial management issues have often produced more fruitful dialogues
between senators and nominees than have questions aboutjudicial philosophy. Eric
L. Clay told Senator Sessions in response to his query about the appropriateness of
oral argument that "it is very valuable to have oral arguments in as many cases as
possible to give the attorneys an opportunity to plead their cases not only in their
227 Id. at 243 (answer of Margaret M. Morrow to written question from Sen. Thurmond).
228 Id. at 269 (exchange between Sen. Sessions and Eric L. Clay).
229 Id. at 281 (exchange between Sen. Sessions and Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.)
230 Id. at 470-71 (responses of Eric Clay to written questions of Sen. Ashcroft); id. at 476
(responses of Eric S. Gold to questions from Senator Ashcroft).
23 Id. at 471-72 (responses of Arthur Joseph Gajarsa to questions from Sen. Thurmond).
232 Id. at 474-75 (responses of Alan S. Gold to questions from Sen. Thurmond); id. at 726
(response of Judge Ishii to questions from Sen. Ashcroft).
233 Id. at 475 (responses of Alan S. Gold to question from Sen. Thurmond).
234 Id. at 776-77 (exchange between Sen. Feingold and Janet C. Hall).
23 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 128.
236 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 138 (response of Charles Wilson to questions
from Sen. Ashcroft).
237 Id. at 177 (testimony of Judge Buchwald).
238 Id. at 177-78 (testimony of Mr. Lorenz).
239 Id. at 178 (testimony of Mr. Marrero).
240 Id. at 229-30 (testimony of Ronald M. Gould).
241 Id. at 68 (response of Karen Schreier to a question from Sen. Hatch).
242 Id. at 70 (response of Stefan R. Underhill to a question from Sen. Hatch).
243 E.g., 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 40 (exchange between Sen. Thurinond and
Margaret M. Morrow); 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 118 (Stewart opposed
mandatory pro bono work); 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, 8 (Cote opposed
mandatory pro bono work).
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written papers... realizing that for most people who come before the court of
appeals . . . this is their very last chance." 4" Senator Sessions replied that he
believed that many cases did not warrant the time and expense that oral arguments
imposed upon litigants and the courts.24 In response to Mr. Clay's agreement that
not every case requires an oral argument, Senator Sessions expressed satisfaction
that the nominee did not share the belief of some judges that every case needs an
oral argument. 46 This exchange helped to demonstrate Mr. Clay's willingness to
give litigants a full opportunity to present their cases, and allowed Senator Sessions
an opportunity to remind Mr. Clay about the importance of containing legal fees and
conserving judicial resources.
H1. PROBING A NOMINEE'S RECORD
A. Positions as an Advocate
Although it is unlikely that judges would permit positions that they advocated
as attorneys to directly bias their judicial decisions, senators often may be able to
discern a nominee's political predilections from the types of clients and cases that
a nominee has had as an attorney. Although most lawyers advocate positions about
which they hold indifferent or conflicting opinions, a nominee who consistently has
acted as an advocate for particular positions or causes is likely to have personal
sympathy for such positions or causes, or at least is likely to have absorbed, perhaps
unconsciously, the attitudes of his clients. Accordingly, it is appropriate for
senators to inquire about a nominee's commitment to issues that he or she has
advocated as an attorney.
At numerous hearings, senators have asked nominees whether the positions they
advocated as attorneys reflect any philosophical commitment to such positions.
Nominees have regularly denied that positions they advocated as attorneys would
influence their decisions on the bench. When asked whether her experience in
representing labor unions in disputes with their members would interfere with her
ability to fairly adjudicate the rights of employees, Marsha S. Berzon assured
Senator Leahy that she was "keenly aware of the difference between an advocacy
position and the position of a judge" and that she would "leave behind all positions
of all my clients and look with an open mind" on all legal issues. 47




247 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 27 (testimony of Ms. Berzon).
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B. Judicial Decisions of Nominees who are Judges
The record of a nominee who already is a jurist provides a particularly useful
means of assessing competence and political predilections. One recent nominee had
the perfect answer to a question about whether she had "any personal, moral, or
religious qualms about enforcing the death penalty," because she was able to point
out that she had imposed capital punishment in all four trials in which a jury had
recommended it.24
The Committee has meticulously questioned highly controversial nominees
about their judicial decisions. For example, the Committee questioned Rosemary
Barkett in depth about her decisions as a justice of the Supreme Court of Florida249
after many conservatives alleged that she had been too lenient toward criminals.25
Barkett's testimony may have helped assuage senatorial concerns since she was
confirmed, albeit by an unusually close vote of 61 to 37.25 ' Similarly, Senate
liberals questioned U.S. District Judge Kenneth E. Ryskamp in detail about his
judicial opinions in civil rights cases.2 52 Possible dissatisfaction over his answers
may have been a factor in the withdrawal of his nomination to the U.S. Court of
Appeals. The questions asked on these occasions have been far more sophisticated
and technical than questions that Committee members have asked about judicial
philosophy. Because judicial decisions can reveal so much about a nominee, the
Committee is wise to invest substantial effort in these inquiries if serious doubts
exist about a nominee.
The Senate has sometimes questioned non-controversial nominees about their
judicial decisions. For example, Senator Simpson questioned the wisdom of a
decision in which Diana G. Motz had invalidated a curfew ordinance. When Motz
explained that she did not believe that all curfew ordinances were necessarily
unconstitutional, Simpson expressed satisfaction that Motz would adjudicate "on
248 Id. at 242 (responses of Florence Marie Cooper to questions from Sen. Smith).
249 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1994 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 2, 103rd Cong. 375-416, 484-509 (1995) [hereinafter 1994
Hearings Part 2].
250 The Wall Street Journal, for example, alleged that "Barkett's brand of liberal
jurisprudence is much to blame for America's crime problem." Editorial, Barkett v. Bill,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1994, at A12. See also Editorial, What Kind of Federal Judges?,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 20, 1993, at 40A. Mailings by the Free Congress Foundation
alleged that Barkett "blames everyone but the killer" and she was "breathtakingly radical."
Bill Rankin, An Immigrant, a Nun, a Judge - And Now a Nominee in Uproar, ATLANTA
CONST., Dec. 26, 1993, at Al. The endorsement of Barkett's nomination by the National
Association of Police Organizations helped to deflate these allegations. Jeanne Cummings,
Nominee Takes Heat in Hearings, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 4, 1994, at A2; 1994 Hearings
Part 2, supra note 249 at 375-76.
251 Clinton's Judicial Picks Confirmed, 1994 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 300 (1994).
252 Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments: 1991 Hearings before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 3, 102nd Cong. 97-117 (1992).
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a case-by-case basis with common sense. ' In another recent hearing, a district
court judge offered a detailed explanation of a decision in which he invalidated an
Illinois statute prohibiting fetal experimentation unless it was beneficial to the
fetus.
25 4
C. Public Speeches and Writing
As questions about a nominee's judicial philosophy often yield so few insights,
the Senate probably can learn more about a nominee by questioning her about
public statements made over the years in her speeches and writings. Because lower
court nominees generally are less likely than Supreme Court nominees to have had
high profile careers in public service or academia prior to their nomination, they are
less apt to have left a "paper trail" of writings and speeches that might embarrass
them at confirmation hearings. Nevertheless, some nominees have made statements
that haunt them at the hearings. On a number of occasions, senators have called
nominees to account for various statements or writings which suggested that they
favored "liberal" positions on various public issues. For example, Senator
Thurmond expressed understandable curiosity about a speech in which Carr had
complained that Congress' growing emphasis on incapacitating rather than
rehabilitating criminals had resulted in a "gulag syndrome."255 Although Carr
refused to recant his criticism of Congress' lack of interest in rehabilitation and its
institution of mandatory minimum sentences, he emphasized that he would feel
bound to faithfully apply the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences.256 Carr also assured Thurmond that his use of the word "gulag" was not
intended to suggest that any American was held in any prison for political
reasons.
257
Similarly, when senators inquired about Richard A. Paez's remark in a public
speech that California's Proposition 187 was "anti-civil rights," Paez explained that
he was merely stating that the Latino community in California was not enthused
about the initiative, that the initiative was controversial, and that he doubted if he
had commented on the same initiative that eventually appeared on the ballot.28 He
also emphasized that initiatives are entitled a high level of judicial deference and
that he respected the Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold the constitutionality of the
initiative.259 When Senator Sessions pointed out that the phrase "anti-civil rights"
253 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 939-40 (testimony of Judge Motz).
254 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 382 (testimony of Judge Anne Claire
Williams).
255 1994 Hearings Part 3, supra note 20, at 122 (exchange between Judge Carr and Sen.
Thusmond).
256 Id. at 122-23.
257 Id. at 123.
258 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 324, 332, 334 (testimony of Judge Paez).
259 Id. at 335.
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seemed to suggest more than merely an expression of Paez's belief that the initiative
was controversial, Paez expressed "regret" that he had used that phrase and
explained that he believed that the initiative was "not anti-civil rights because it
sought to ensure equal opportunity and to make that clear and to basically eliminate
government-sponsored.., affirmative action programs. '"260
In inquiring about a nominee's public statements, senators all too often fail to
consider the implications of such statements or push the nominees to explain their
meaning. Asked about a speech that could have been interpreted as criticizing the
Supreme Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions, a nominee briefly
summarized existing law and assured the committee that she accepted as binding
precedent "the Court's construction of the powers of Congress with respect to the
waiver of sovereign immunity of the states., 26' Rather than trying to determine
whether she intended her remarks as a criticism of the Court's decisions, Senator
Hatch replied, "Well, I think we've asked enough questions here. There are a lot of
other questions, naturally we could ask. '262 Indeed. But he did not ask them.
In a few instances, nominees' writings have troubled senators. Conservative
members of the committee were troubled by a Buffalo Law Review note that
Clarence J. Sundram wrote as a student more than a quarter of a century before his
nomination in which Sundram defended affirmative action. 63 Guido Calabresi was
questioned about a newspaper column in which he had harshly attacked the activism
of the Rehnquist Court.264 Calabresi replied that he would "not think that words of
that sort would be appropriate in a judicial opinion, or even in a work of
scholarship" but that they were not inappropriate in an op-ed piece.26 Calabresi
also assured the Committee that he would apply even those Supreme Court
decisions with which he disagreed.2" Similarly, Senator Kyl expressed concern
about Lynn S. Adelman's authorship of a state bar journal article arguing on policy
grounds against the reinstatement of capital punishment in Wisconsin.2 67 Adelman
assured Kyl that nothing in his personal beliefs would prevent him from abiding by
U.S. Supreme Court precedent sustaining the constitutionality of the death
260 Id. at 334 and 626.
26! May 25, 2000 Hearings, supra note 85 (testimony of Judge Taylor Swain). Judge
Taylor Swain had stated in her speech that the "Supreme Court's recent states' rights
decisions, particularly in the sovereign immunity area, change radically settled assumptions
regarding private civil litigation as means ofenforcing federally recognized rights, including
in the discrimination area." Id.
262 Id.
263 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 499 (testimony of Sundram in reference to
Buffalo Law Review article.)
264 1994 Hearings Part 4, supra note 28, at 230 (testimony of Calabresi).
265 Id.
266 id.
267 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 1015 (testimony of Adelman).
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penalty.268
In some instances, questions about publications can stimulate dialogue with the
nominee on significant constitutional issues. For example, one recent nominee
provided a long and thoughtful written response to an inquiry about a law review
article concerning Congress' power to limit thejurisdiction of the federal courts. 269
D. Memberships
Senators also have examined the organizations to which nominees belong in
order to obtain clues to the political predilections of the nominee. In their zeal to
sniff out "judicial activism," some senators during recent years have seemed almost
to regard American Bar Association membership as subversive. Some senators
have asked nominees if they ever have been ABA members almost as if they were
asking them if they had ever been members of the Communist Party.""
Accordingly, senators at numerous confirmation hearings have asked nominees who
have been ABA members whether they believe that it is appropriate for the ABA
to make controversial pronouncements about subjects such as abortion, capital
punishment, affirmative action, and gun control. Not surprisingly, nominees have
uniformly expressed misgivings about the both the ABA's practice of taking
positions on controversial issues and the substance of those positions.27' Pressed
hard by senators for an explanation of why she had signed a 1992 report calling for
the ABA to take a position on abortion, McKeown renounced this action, stating
that she had learned during the subsequent six years that ABA pronouncements on
controversial issues are unduly divisive and that the ABA should stick to focusing
268 Id.
269 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 71 (responses of Stefan R. Underhill to
questions from Sen. Sessions).
270 1997 Hearings Part 2, supra note 21, at 11 (exchange between Sen. Specter and
Marjorie 0. Rendell).
271 In a typical answer, Robert W. Pratt stated in response to a question from Senator
Hatch that he did not believe that controversial ABA pronouncements were appropriate
because "[w]e have got enough problems in the ABA about delivering legal services without
getting into issues that reasonable people can and do disagree that become divisive and do
not accomplish what the bar association ought to be about." 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra
note 6, at 24. He acknowledged in response to further questioning from Senator Leahy that
the ABA has the right to speak out on such issues. Id. at 25. One of the bolder answers was
given by Donald W. Middlebrooks, who acknowledged that "it is important for the
association to speak out for lawyers and to engage in the debate." Id. at 24. Middlebrooks
therefore stated that he was not certain that the ABA should not speak out on controversial
issues even though he disagreed with some of the ABA's positions. Id. See also id. at 472
(responses to questions for Arthur Joseph Gajarsa from Sen. Thurmond) ("the ABA should
exercise extreme caution in taking positions on which there is significant splits of opinion
among its members.").
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"on administration of justice and lawyers and the practice of law." '272
Although senators have little reason to fear that ABA membership is necessarily
an expression of belief in judicial activism, senators have more understandably
expressed concern that the ABA during its screening interviews has asked nominees
about their positions on controversial issues on which the ABA has taken a stand.
Nominees have uniformly assured senators that the ABA has not inquired about
such subjects and that the ABA interviews were limited to questions about non-
political issues such as experience, judicial temperament, and case management.273
Some senators also have taken a dim view of membership in the American Civil
Liberties Union and nominees have sometimes taken pains to disassociate
themselves from the ACLU's more controversial pronouncements. Margaret M.
Morrow, who had served as chair of the ACLU of Washington Legal Committee,
assured Senator Hatch that she had not provided any legal opinions to the ACLU
and had played no role in determining those issues upon which the ACLU would
take a position or litigate.27 She also stated in reply to a question from Senator
Hatch that she was unfamiliar with the details of the many positions adopted by the
ACLU.275 Similarly, Susan Old Mollway, who served as a member of the board of
directors of the Hawaii ACLU, assured senators that she had no role in the Hawaii
ACLU's support for state legislation to legalize same-sex marriages.276
After T. John Ward refused in a response to a written question from Senator
Sessions to reveal whether he personally agreed with various specific positions of
the ACLU on the grounds that his personal views would not influence his judicial
decisions, 77 Sessions reiterated the question, explaining that a judge "will be
required to hear cases involving illegal drugs, and, as a result, I think it is
appropriate to ask a prospective nominee about their personal opinion on such an
issue, if only to assess to my satisfaction that a nominee contains no inner biases
that would prevent them from properly applying applicable law." '278 In an amended
response, Ward expressed disagreement with various ACLU positions on the
grounds that they were contrary to settled Supreme Court precedent. 279
2172 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 252 (response of M. Margaret McKeown to
question from Sen. Thurmond).
273 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 32 (testimony of Jeffrey T. Miller, Donald W.
Middlebrooks, & Robert W. Pratt).
274 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 246.
275 id.
276 Id. at 275-76 (answers of Susan Oki Mollway to follow-up questions from Sen.
Sessions).
277 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 73 (responses of T. John Ward to questions
from Sen. Sessions)
278 Id. at 76..
279 Id. at 76-77.
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III. "ADVICE" TO NOMINEES
Confirmation hearings provide an excellent forum for senators to discharge
their constitutional obligation to offer "advice" on nominations on providing advice
to nominees about a wide range of issues. During the Clinton Administration,
senators used the hearings as a forum for admonishing the nominees to exercise
judicial restraint. Indeed, many of the seemingly perfunctory or pointless questions
about judicial restraint have perhaps been designed more to provide senators with
an opportunity to emphasize the importance of judicial restraint than to elicit any
response from the nominee.28 For example, Hatch reminded one group of recent
nominees at the close of their testimony that "it is very important that you
understand the roles you have, which is not to make the laws," except in cases of
first impression.28" ' Hatch admonished the nominees that "you really need to follow
the precedent of the upper courts or we lose control of the system. If judges start
usurping the role of the legislative branch or the executive branch, this country will
not survive in its present form. It has been the judiciary that has kept the
Constitution viable and active." '282
The hearings also provide an opportunity for senators to admonish nominees to
maintain a balanced judicial temperament. Senator Thurmond, for example,
regularly has urged nominees to remain humble and display courtesy toward
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys.28 3 Senator Specter advised a nominee to be
courteous to litigants and attorneys, explaining that he feared that "judges,
especially judges with life tenure, tend to forget that very fast."28 Senator Biden
has urged nominees to "remember where you came from,"2s and Senator Sessions
has reminded a nominee that "judges are appointed, not anointed." '286 Although
such admonitions may sound perfunctory, they may serve a useful purpose, for the
nominees are unlikely to receive any lecture on humility once they are confirmed.287
Senators sometimes have offered advice on more technical issues. For
example, Senators Ashcroft and Torricelli advised one group of nominees to be
280 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1033 (remarks of Sen. DeWine).
281 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 181.
282 id.
283 Id. at 119.
284 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 19.
285 Id. at 667.
286 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 281.
287 Senator Specter remarked at a recent hearing that he has come to appreciate the
wisdom of Senator Thurmond's traditional queries about courtesy during Thurmond's service
on the Judiciary Committee. Although Specter explained that he originally had thought,
"What kind of question is that? What is the witness going to say but yes?," he was
impressed by the profundity ofThurmond's reminder of the need for courtesy among persons
who exercise great power. 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 320.
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
wary of the accuracy of statements in congressional committee reports.288
In some instances, senators appear to have sought advice from nominees,
particularly with respect to the experience of sitting judges in administering various
aspects of criminal procedure. For example, Senator Thurmond asked two nominees
whether they believed that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act had helped to reduce
frivolous actions by prisoners or whether it had placed too many restrictions on the
ability ofjudges to remedy constitutional violations of prisoner rights.289 Although
neither nominee offered a detailed critique of the statute, they assured the senator
that the statute was operating in a useful and fair manner.9
The hearings also sometimes provide an opportunity for senators to elicit the
thoughts of nominees about issues on which Congress might legislate. For example,
Senator Sessions asked Anthony Droney, a former United States attorney, for his
opinion about restrictions on allowing defendants to speak with prosecutors.29'
As Robert A. Katzmann has pointed out, the hearings "also provide senators
with opportunities to communicate with, and appeal to their constituencies."292
Indeed, the desire of senators to use the hearings as a way of communicating with
constituents may explain much of the superficiality of the questions and the failure
of the senators to ask useful questions following up responses by nominees.
Senators may be more interested in what they themselves have to say than in what
the nominees have to say. Their questions are designed more as statements to
reassure constituencies of the soundness of their own views about such subjects as
abortion and capital punishment than to elicit the opinions of the nominees.
Moreover, the mere act of asking questions about these subjects helps to assure
constituents that senators have been vigilant in trying to prevent the appointment of
judges who hold other views; accordingly, the response of the nominee is irrelevant
unless the nominee actually opposes the senator's opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because federal judges exercise such substantial power and enjoy lifetime
tenure, the Senate has a duty to thoroughly examine every judicial nomination in
order to make certain that the nominee meets the high standards of professional
competence, experience, and integrity that a federal judgeship requires. Insofar as
even lower federal judges are instrumental in shaping the law, it also is appropriate
288 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 508-09 (remarks of Sen. Ashcroft and Sen.
Torricelli).
289 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 383-84 (testimony of Frank H. McCarthy and
Virgina A. Phillips).
290 Id.
29' 1997 Hearings Part 1, supra note 6, at 511-12 (remarks of Sen. Sessions); id. at 511
(testimony of Anthony Droney).
292 1999 Hearings Part /, supra note 25, at 36 (citing South Dakota Senator Larry L.
Pressler's questioning of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg about Indian jurisdiction).
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for senators to inquire into the ideological predilections of judicial nominees.
Although the written and oral questions with which the Senate Judiciary Committee
probe the background and opinions of the nominees go far in helping to assess the
intellectual, professional, ethical, and political character of nominees, the written
questions could benefit from some minor changes and the process of oral
questioning needs more substantial reform.
The written questionnaire that is available to the public provides a
comprehensive portrait of the nominee's professional credentials, offers useful
insights the process through which the nominee was selected, and provides
information, including a financial statement, that helps to identify potential conflicts
of interest. Efforts to ensure that judges have high personal integrity are further
enhanced by the confidential questionnaire, which asks about tax problems,
bankruptcy, and proceedings involving ethical violations.
The written questionnaires would have more effectively helped to assess the
integrity of nominees if the Judiciary Committee, under pressure from its
Republican members, had not during the late autumn of 2001 withdrawn several
revisions that the Committee promulgated in September 2001. In particular, the
public questionnaire ought to have continued to ask nominees about criminal
convictions within a twenty year period rather than reducing the time period to ten
years. Indeed, the questionnaire ideally should ask whether a nominee ever has
been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense. Because the Senate - and
the nation - has the right to expect that judges have always led lives that are
beyond reproach, the Senate should know about any criminal conviction, since even
an offense in the distant past casts a pall over the nominee's present integrity.
Moreover, such an extension presumably would not unduly protract the
confirmation process because one surely hope that such an extension of the question
would affect only a small proportion of nominees.
Similarly, the confidential questionnaire ought to have retained questions about
the use, possession, or distribution of illegal substances. Because so many lower
federal judges preside over drug offense prosecutions, prior drug use by a judge is
relevant in several respects. For example, one could argue that ajudge who himself
has broken drug laws is morally unfit to pass judgment on others who have broken
similar laws. Prior drug use by a judge might make the judge more lenient in
enforcing the laws than many senators might prefer. A history of drug abuse also
might indicate the nominee continues to have a drug problem that could adversely
affect the performance of his judicial duties.
Although much of this information may be available in FBI reports, the
confidential questionnaire might have produced information about drug offenses
that even the FBI was unable to uncover. Moreover, FBI reports are available only
to the nineteen members of the Judiciary Committee and are not available to the
remaining eight-one senators who will vote on the nomination if it is reported out
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of committee, except through the filter of Judiciary Committee staff. While critics
of the questions expressed fear that the confidential information would be leaked
by Judiciary Committee staff members and could unduly embarrass nominees, a
nominee who has a history of significant lawbreaking warrants public scrutiny.
It is also unfortunate that the Judiciary Committee withdrew from the
confidential questionnaire the query about campaign contributions. While the
questionnaire continues to ask nominees to describe their role in political
campaigns, a nominee could easily argue that campaign contributions are beyond
the scope of this question. Likewise, specific disclosure of campaign contributions
is needed even though much of this information is available from other sources
because reference to such sources would waste the precious resources of an already
overworked committee. Explicit questions about contributions are needed because
the Senate and the public have a right to know the extent to which federal
judgeships may be rewards for political activity. 93 Indeed, Alexander Hamilton
indicated in The Federalist that amelioration of personal favoritism of presidents
would be one of the Senate's principal roles in the confirmation process.294
Although critics of this question contended that campaign contributions are
irrelevant if a candidate is otherwise qualified for a judgeship, this argument
overlooks the fact that there are degrees of qualification and that political
contributions may result in the nomination of a well qualified candidate rather than
an even better qualified candidate. Although it is unrealistic to expect to banish all
political favoritism from the appointments process, and there even may be sound
reasons why partisan loyalty is a legitimate factor in this process, the degree to
which favoritism may be a factor should at least be apparent for all to see.
While much information about campaign contributions is available from other
sources, the confirmation process would be slowed if the Judiciary Committee had
to take the considerable time necessary to compile the data from such sources.
Moreover, the inclusion of this information on the questionnaire itself is likely to
enhance public awareness of the role that contributions may play in the judicial
selection process. Candidates remain free to inform the Judiciary Committee about
293 One early survey has found that nearly half of Bush's nominees to federal judgeships
have donated money to the Republican party, although none gave more than twenty thousand
dollars - a mere mite in today's political world. Alexander Bolton, Bush Judicial Nominees
Gave Money to GOP Candidates, THE HILL, July 25, 2001, at 1.
294 THE FEDERALIST, NO. 76, at 513 (A. Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Hamilton
explained that the participation of the Senate in the appointment process:
[W]ould have a powerful, though in general a silent operation. It would be an
excellent check upon the spirit of favoritism in the president, and would tend
greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from
family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity."
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drug offenses, campaign contributions, and criminal convictions that are more than
ten years old in response to an invitation at the end of the confidential questionnaire
to "advise the Committee of any unfavorable information that may affect your
nomination." This general language, however, does not explicitly require
information about otherwise undisclosed drug convictions, criminal offenses, and
campaign contributions. It could place conscientious nominees at a disadvantage
since they might disclose innocent offenses that could impede their nomination,
while other nominees fail to disclose far more damaging information. Even though
the omission of questions about campaign contributions and drug offenses and the
erosion of questions about the question about criminal convictions seriously
diminishes the rigor of the written questionnaire, the written questions probably
need less reform than the oral questions asked at Senate confirmation hearings.
In contrast to the generally satisfactory nature of the Judiciary Committee's
written questionnaires, the quality and depth of oral questioning varies widely.
Provocative issues are regularly raised at confirmation hearings, but often are
abruptly terminated. Senators frequently ask elaborate questions to which nominees
proffer safely minimalist responses, which are stillborn because senators typically
fail to ask follow-up questions, moving instead onto an unrelated topic.
When asking questions about judicial philosophy, senators often seemed to be
prodding Clinton nominees to provide orthodox renunciations of judicial restraint
rather than engaging in genuine dialogue, perhaps because the senators were
primarily interested in admonishing the nominees to exercise restraint. Questions
about substantive issues are often stymied because nominees properly refuse to
provide answers that might create the appearance that they have pre-judged an issue
that could come before them on the bench. Even so, many nominees who have
testified before the committee could have provided at least general insights into
their views about issues that may come before them on the bench without violating
the Canons of Judicial Conduct by creating an appearance of prejudice or
impropriety.
Since nearly all nominees are confirmed - the Senate voted down only one of
Clinton's nominees - nominees may have an incentive to provide opaque replies
to questions insofar as reticence will almost never harm a nomination while a
controversial remark could perhaps jeopardize confirmation.2 9 The transcripts of
many hearings suggest, however, that senators would have little interest in
addressing substantive questions in greater depth even if the nominees were less
reticent.
Tie dialogue between senators and nominees often has been most fruitful when
295 Expressing understandable frustration over this problem, Senator Smith observed with
some exaggeration in 1999 that nominees who refuse to answer questions about controversial
issues "get confirmed and the ones who do don't." 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at
167.
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it involves mundane issues of judicial management rather than politically
controversial subjects. The hearings also often perform the useful function of
enabling senators to give advice to the nominees, and the personal appearance of the
nominees helps senators to assess their temperament. Technical legal issues usually
are explored with sophistication only when the committee probes the judicial
decisions of highly controversial nominees who have served as judges.
The questioning of lower federal nominees is certainly less thorough than the
questioning of Supreme Court nominees. The superficial dialogues between
senators and lower federal nominees contrast sharply with the rich constitutional
law seminars that hearings on Supreme Court nominees have become during the
past several decades. Senators, however, have a least as much licence to explore the
backgrounds and opinions of lower federal court nominees as to scrutinize Supreme
Court nominees. Indeed the Senate's role in confirming lower federal judges may
be even more expansive than is its role in confirming Supreme Court nominees
insofar as Congress created the lower federal courts and may have the power to
eliminate these courts or at least to significantly constrict their jurisdiction.296
It is unrealistic, however, to expect the Senate to examine lower federal
nominees with the same intensity that it devotes to Supreme Court nominees.
Although the Judiciary Committee's questioning of many nominees may be
perfunctory, it is difficult to see how the Committee could conduct more detailed
inquiries since the Committee must review so many judicial confirmations. During
the 106th Congress, President Clinton made eighty-three district court nominations
and thirty-two Court of Appeals nominees, of whom the Senate confirmed fifty-
seven of the former and thirteen of the latter. 97 With an average of at least thirty
confirmations per year, the Committee obviously lacks time to devote days on
hearings for each nominee. If the Committee conducted hearings on each nominee
that were as time-consuming and elaborate as its hearings on Supreme Court
nominees, the Committee would have time for little or no other business.
To the extent that senators lack time for more elaborate confirmation hearings,
they might be able to delegate some of their work to staff. The transcripts of
hearings already leave the impression that senators often are reading questions
prepared by staff and that they are unable or unwilling to prod the nominees for
more specific responses. Dissatisfaction with the superficiality of questioning
Supreme Court nominees has inspired various proposals to have Senate staff
members conduct at least part of the questioning of nominees. The sheer volume
of lower federal nominations may make questioning by staff more justifiable for
296 As Professor Yackle has explained, "[t]he very existence of the lower federal courts
may depend upon congressional will, and, certainly, the jurisdiction of those courts is open
to congressional adjustment of at least some sort. It follows... that Congress can specify
qualifications for federal judgeships." Yackle, supra note 76, at 321-22.
297 Sheldon Goldman, et. al, Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE
228, 231 (Mar.-Apr. 2001).
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lower federal nominees than it is for Supreme Court nominees. Perhaps the proper
balance could be maintained through Professor Katzmann' s suggestion that senators
might "use special counsels in particular circumstances for instance, with regard to
highly technical and abstruse points of law." Under this proposal, these special
counsels, with the guidance of senators, "could engage nominees in detailed but
appropriate discussions, in much the same way that other committees make use of
staff."29 Time constraints may make questioning by staff morejustifiable in lower
federal confirmation proceedings than in Supreme Court nominations.299
In addition to lack of time and resources, senators also may refrain from
rigorous questioning of all but the most controversial nominees because they
assume that the confirmation is inevitable. Senators from the party that does not
control the White House may feel resigned to the appointment of nominees who
generally do not share their views and may prefer to concentrate their efforts on
influencing the nomination process itself" and opposing the confirmation only of
the most extreme nominees. As Senator Hatch told a news reporter in 1996, "[o]nly
if nominees are off-the-wall should you reject them. But if they are in the
mainstream then you have no reason to block them."30' Senators also may fear that
they will lose credibility if they oppose nominations except in the rarest cases. As
Senator Metzenbaum has explained, "[y]ou don't just always want to stand in a
negative position. And if you're going to be effective on the controversial ones, you
have to let some go by that you don't think are so good. 30 2
Moreover, a senator generally has more to lose than to gain from opposing a
nomination. The reasons for opposing a nomination are abstractions, but the
nominee herself is a person. The nominee and her principal supporters generally
have far more of a stake in the nomination's success than its opponents have in its
failure. Hostility toward a dissident senator among supporters of a nomination is
298 1999 Hearings Part 1, supra note 25, at 42.
299 For an argument that the questioning of Supreme Court nominees is too important to
delegate to staff members, see William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process:
A Search for a Synthesis, 57 ALB. L. REv. 993, 1011-13 (1994).
" Senator Hatch contended in 1996 that one of the reasons why he had opposed so few
of Clinton's nominees is because he prevented at least thirty nominations by calling the
president to express reservations about prospective nominees. Jamie Dettmer & Lisa Leitner,
Judicial Choices Raise Objections, INSIGHT MAGAZINE, Apr. 29, 1996, at 8.
30, Id. Some Republican members of the Judiciary Committee, however, were reported
during the Clinton Administration to believe that the committee should take a more active
role in scrutinizing judicial nominees. Id. Similarly, many Republicans and conservatives
outside Congress citicized the Judiciary Committee during the 1990s for what they
perceived as excessive deference to the president. Thomas L. Jipping, director ofthe judicial-
selection monitoring project at the Free Congress Foundation, complained that "[s]enatorial
courtesy is the single most perverse factor in the selection process. It has been the reason for
the code of silence." Id.
302 Joan Biskupic, Bush Treads Well- Worn Path in Building Federal Bench, 50 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 111, 113 (Jan. 18, 1992).
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likely to persist long after gratitude toward the senator has faded away among
opponents of the nomination.3 '
If members of either party wish to maximize their influence on the
appointments process, however, they need to ask more probing questions of lower
federal nominees. The tepidity of questions at most confirmation hearings suggests
that senators of both parties are unduly embarrassed about asking probing questions.
Unlike religious confirmations in churches and synagogues, judicial confirmations
in the Senate should not necessarily be sedate ceremonies, devoid of embarrassing
criticism of the confirmands, in which the outcome is pre-ordained. If the Senate
is going to defer to judicial nominees at confirmation proceedings the way that one
would honor a youth at a bar or bat mitzvah, a bride and groom at a wedding, or a
corpse at a funeral, then the Senate might as well relinquish any pretense to offering
'advice and consent' and simply routinely approve judicial nominees the way it
approves nominees for countless thousands of military, postal, and sundry other
civil service jobs.
Accordingly, senators ordinarily should not fear that questions at confirmation
hearings will embarrass nominees, for such embarrassment is a small price to pay
for providing more useful information to the Senate and more information to the
public at large. As Professor Tobias points out, however, sometimes "[t]he
possibilities of embarrassment, wasting scarce resources, or creating citizen
disrespect for the process may suggest that public treatment is less beneficial or
even desirable." ' 4 Accordingly, there is merit in Tobias's suggestion that the
Senate should conduct inquiries about judicial philosophy in private in rare
instances if the nominee prefers to have the hearing conducted behind closed
303 Similarly, Nina Totenberg, in commenting on Supreme Court appointments, has written
that:
[M]ost senators would rather not spend their time and political capital on an
arduous confirmation process. It is a politically risky business. Controversial issues
are likely to be stirred up. A confirmation battle can only create new enemies back
home. And what does the politician get for his trouble? Nothing concrete. No
legislation. No campaign money. Maybe he'll satisfy some of his supporters. But
he'll infuriate others. At rock bottom, all a senator gets out of the confirmation
process, if it turns controversial, is one's personal satisfaction that comes from
doing what he thinks is right.
Nina Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1213, 1213-14 (1988).
" Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal Appellate Openings on the 9th Circuit, 19 REv. LrrlG.
233, 255 (2000). Tobias acknowledges that the Senate generally should examine nominees
"freely and openly in a public forum" and that the circumstances under which closed hearings
would be conducted "will probably be unusual, and should be handled through private
negotiations involving specific candidates," the Committee chair, and the president or their
designees. Id.
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The common practice in which nominees bring family members and friends to
the hearings. 6 also may discourage serious questioning of nominees, although it is
difficult to determine whether nominees bring their families because they do not
expect harsh questioning or whether senators refrain from tough questioning
because they do not wish to embarrass nominees in front of their spouses, children,
and friends. In order to reduce senatorial inhibitions about asking bold questions,
the Judiciary Committee should discourage or even prohibit nominees from
bringing anyone with them to the hearing other than their counsel. For a festive
occasion, families and assorted well-wishers should await the swearing-in
ceremony.
Fears that a more rigorous review process will scare off desirable nominees are
largely bogus. One could better argue that a process which lacks rigor will attract
rogues. A nominee or potential nominee who has led a life of probity and who has
compiled an honorable record of service in the legal profession should have no
reason to fear anything more than annoyance from even the most feral senator.
Only an unduly thin-skinned nominee could take personal umbrage at harsh
criticism from senators, news media, or public interest groups who oppose his
nomination on ideological grounds, since such criticism is not personal but rather
political. If the Senate criticizes or investigates the personal conduct of the
nominee, such conduct probably deserves scrutiny, although such scrutiny is rare.
Even if the process were much more rambunctious, it is likely that the large
majority of nominees would still be confirmed. There is no evidence that nominees
who have been maligned during the confirmation process suffer diminished
credibility on the bench. Indeed, some of the most controversial Supreme Court
nominees have gone on to rank among the esteemed Justices - Louis D. Brandeis
is an example. Criticism of lower court nominees is less likely to blight the careers
of such nominees since criticism of those nominees is likely to receive much less
media attention, and thereby make much less of an impression upon attorneys,
litigants, court personnel, and others whose respect the judge needs. Moreover, to
the extent that the criticism is political rather than personal, the criticism is not
likely to harm the judge's reputation at all, and may even enhance it among persons
who love the judge for the enemies she has made. It would be absurd to argue, for
example, that Thurgood Marshall's reputation suffered from the opposition of a
hard core of segregationist senators who grilled him harshly and voted in opposition
to him when he was nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme
Court. Marshall's fortitude in the face of such insults is one reason why we honor
305 Id.
'o' One recent nominee, for example, was accompanied at the hearings by his wife, his
parents, a son, a daughter, a nephew, several of the nephew's friends, and a friend and his
wife and her brother. 1998 Hearings Part 3, supra note 22, at 1031 (testimony of Stephan
P. Mickle).
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his memory.
A person who is under consideration for a lifetime post of the highest trust
should expect, and even welcome, careful scrutiny by the Senate. Most women and
men who have survived so much of the rough and tumble of life that they are
candidates for a federal judgeship are sturdy creatures who are not likely to sacrifice
the rich prize of a federal judgeship because they fear the evanescent sting of a few
senatorial tongues. The Senate should therefore not hesitate to question lower
federal court nominees more aggressively during the confirmation process.
